

INTRODUCTION: A NEW ANTIQUITY

“LIKE THE WORLD OF A DREAM”

Toward the beginning of a long stay in Paris in 1885, a cultivated 29-year-old Viennese wrote home about the wonders of the Ancient Near Eastern collections of the Louvre.

I just had time for a fleeting glance at the Assyrian and Egyptian rooms, which I must visit again several times. There were Assyrian kings—tall as trees and holding lions for lapdogs in their arms, winged bulls with human figures, their hair beautifully dressed, cuneiform inscriptions as clear as if they had been engraved yesterday, and then Egyptian bas-reliefs decorated in fiery colors, colossal kings, real sphinxes, all like the world of a dream [eine Welt wie im Traum] (cf. Figs. 11–12).¹

Sigmund Freud was writing to his fiancée Martha Bernays. This may have been his last unguarded remark on dreams.

Archaeology, both as activity and metaphor, has a remarkable centrality to Freud’s thought.² Freud’s response to these ancient artifacts resonates throughout this study as well for many reasons. At points in this book, we will find an almost paradigmatic Freudian mechanics in the reaction of some beholders to Assyrian art. The objects first move and overwhelm the viewer in a seemingly visceral, prerational manner only to be later repressed under the control of what seems to be an aesthetically concerned superego, determined to uphold the artistic supremacy of ancient Greek art.

Even more, Freud’s response introduces the very interaction between object and viewer that constitutes artistic reception. Considered in light of his own incipient research, his remarks offer insight into the very process of reception, and the particular historical moment to be considered. To get at this, though, we must consider Freud’s Assyrian dream world in the social, as much as psychological, dimensions of the public apprehension of archaeological discovery. Just as archaeology served Freud as what has been called “a mighty metaphor” in the analysis of dreams, we can

take Freud's conception of a dream as a perfect metaphor for the nineteenth-century apprehension of the fruits of Ancient Near Eastern archaeology.

Reading Freud's letter more closely helps to place Assyria in its nineteenth-century context. First, it is striking that Freud devotes far more attention to the arts of ancient Assyria than those of Egypt. Indeed, his description of Egyptian "colossal kings" comes across as merely a laconic echo of powerful Assyrian kings "as large as trees, holding lions in their hands as if they were lap dogs." This relation of Assyria to Egypt is precisely the opposite of more recent times, in which ancient Egypt plays the dominant role in public awareness. It is a hint of the period's unique excitement about the Assyrian discoveries, which first brought to light in the West numerous objects of remarkable, virtually unprecedented style and subject, from an ancient culture of great interest but little previous direct trace: a new antiquity.

Also evident in Freud's description is the role of the museum's display in evincing his enthusiasm. It is a compelling sight "which I will have to revisit many times." The "real sphinxes" or cuneiform inscriptions "as clear as if they had been engraved yesterday" would seem to suggest a sort of ideal presence perceived in the display, a historicist window to a distant culture. This was a paradigmatic reaction to viewing Assyrian artifacts in the nineteenth century, which we will find in responses throughout Europe. It is the reaction, for example, of one of Thomas Hardy's characters in *The Hand of Ethelberta* of 1876, in a room at the British Museum "lined with bas-reliefs from Nineveh."

Only just think that this is not imagined of Assyria, but done in Assyrian times by Assyrian hands. Don't you feel as if you were actually in Nineveh; that as we now walk between these slabs, so walked Ninevites between them once?²

Such a response is characteristic of the modern approach to ancient objects. It is the unique category of "age-value," codified in the early twentieth century by Alois Riegl. Riegl distinguished age-value from more established modes of interpretation such as seeing an artifact in terms of its artistic or historical value.³ As Stephen Bann states, the age-value of an artifact "is defined by its immediate accessibility to perception" in a way prior to any scholarly knowledge or conventional education. It is just this sense of wonderment at "being there" that is celebrated by Hardy's character and highlighted (or constructed) within the space of the museum.

The emergence of age-value in the nineteenth century has fundamental ramifications—social, intellectual, and political—for the history of Assyrian reception. But even more than particular values, this interpretive range itself is crucial. Implicit within it is a fragmentation of the experience of the ancient artifact between different modes of valuation (and different audiences): the antiquarian, the aesthetic, and, based on age-value what we might call the material, focused on the sheer imposing quiddity of the objects.

These three sorts of approaches to antiquities will be central to our inquiry, as well. The aesthetic in particular, located somewhere between the omnivorous range of age-value and the rigidly codified social and intellectual boundaries of the antiquarian realm, plays a central role. But these valuative modes appear in differing relations and with fluid boundaries at different times and places. For precisely this reason, we return to one final point in Freud's unique insight on viewing Assyria.

Like Hardy's character, Freud is impressed by the aura of antiquity in the artifacts, but his reaction is not one of naive identity with them. For him, too, the museum creates a "world;" however, it is not one in which everyday experience reigns. Freud suggests instead a certain wonder at the museum's ability to summon an interiorized experience, "like the world of a dream." His concept of the dream, then just being formed, connects us directly to questions of representation and display, to the machinery behind the hallucinatory experience of Hardy's character, and to the means of its broader commodification and promulgation to nineteenth-century audiences.

In his research in the following decade, through the publication in 1900 of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud sought to analyze the way normally intelligible elements from waking life were reformulated in dreams to serve other kinds of drives beside those that apparently dominated everyday existence. Extrapolating from the vision of a museum's Assyrian display as the world of a dream, one can posit that the museum too practices a version of what Freud termed "dream-work," a rearrangement or transformation of discrete elements that fit requirements distinct from those of prior, normative experience. As a dream is distant from waking reality but also created from it, so the museum's display is distant from the actuality of ancient Assyria, but at the same time, quite literally, made up of it. Considering the display of ancient artifacts in the context of a dream means considering them in terms of *transformations*, in a fluid setting governed at least as much by the needs and desires of the Western host as by any quality of the individual objects. Rather than inherent values, the properties of ancient Mesopotamian artifacts as perceived by their nineteenth-century viewers are best approached as something like shared dreams: social projections situated in unique, discontinuous contexts (such as personal, communal, institutional, or national), applied to a relatively common repertory of objects.

Such transformations of Assyria and related ancient Mesopotamian cultures are the basic topic of this book. In fact, Assyria was literally made into a dream. Many popular sources on the archaeological rediscovery of Assyria in the nineteenth century begin with references to dreamy, childhood visions of the East, based on texts like *The Thousand and One Nights*. But, as also recognized by Freud, the dream is not only to be taken in a literal sense.

As we shall see in some detail, the work of filtering, revising, and reconstructing Assyria was staged not only in nineteenth-century museums, but throughout its

richly varied visual culture. These dream-like transformations range from those of a primarily political or ideological nature to those controlled by historical or aesthetic postulates to physical or instrumental ones. Further, the ordering, circulation, and emulation of the Ancient Near East (both within and beyond museums) must be seen in connection with larger complexes of social tensions, suppositions, needs, and desires: all the kinds of things manifested, on an individual level, in dreams. That, put most broadly, is the argument of this book.

Freud's thoughts are not merely applicable to the nineteenth-century reception of Ancient Near Eastern archaeology, but, in fact, structurally complicit with it. Following them a bit farther, we find a figure central to our own study. What has been called Freud's "infatuation" with archaeology was focused particularly on the work of one man: Heinrich Schliemann.⁵ Transfixing and original as was his success in the later nineteenth century, it had a specific model, as Schliemann himself freely admitted. Schliemann's *Ilios* of 1881, on the rediscovery of Homer's Troy, is dedicated to "the Right Honorable Sir Austen Henry Layard . . . Pioneer in Recovering the Lost History of the Ancient Cities of Western Asia. . . ."

Layard is central to this narrative. He is the virtual founder of Assyrian archaeology in England, whose finds are the core of the British Museum's extraordinary Assyrian holdings. But Schliemann's dedication to Layard's pioneering work not only commemorates his finds, but also Layard's energetic publicization of his discoveries. Layard's finds were, in fact, both made and mounted in the West slightly later than those of the Frenchman Paul-Émile Botta, whose discoveries Freud was actually viewing in the Louvre. Indeed, France beat England in the great imperial contest to be the first to bring to Europe remains of ancient Assyria. But today Layard's name looms so much larger, due largely to his genius for publicization, within the favorable English milieu analyzed in this book. Indeed, it is in his function as publicist that we will first meet him. Layard's *Nineveh and Its Remains* has been called the greatest archaeological bestseller of the nineteenth century.⁶ Freud's fascination with Schliemann and the "ur-narrative" of archaeological discovery pioneered by Layard are also behind his attitude of wonder in the Louvre's Ancient Near Eastern galleries.

As I hope all this suggests, this book is not primarily concerned with ancient Assyrian archaeology itself, but rather with what was made of it in Europe during roughly the second half of the nineteenth century and a bit beyond. My goal is to elaborate the matrix of institutions, ideologies, and audiences through which the cultural image and the very artifacts of ancient Assyria (and related portions of the Ancient Near East) were both circulated and continually reinvented among audiences in England, France, and Germany at particular moments between the initial archaeological discoveries and the First World War. Freud is only the first

of a wide range of viewers we will consider: aristocrats and commoners, scholars and amateurs, artists and critics. For many, as for Freud, Mesopotamia had a sort of compulsive, mysterious quality. But it was one very differently construed by different viewers, as varying and even contradictory interests, needs, competencies, fears, and identities were brought to bear.

While Mesopotamia is my goal, I am also fundamentally concerned with the methodological and theoretical tools employed to track it. The first chapter of this book elaborates their role here and continued theoretical considerations are woven throughout the text. This interplay between method and subject is designed to provide opportunity both to theorize history and historicize theory. This sort of dialectical interplay is particularly appropriate to a study of reception. I conceive of reception through the reception theory enunciated by Hans-Robert Jauss as well as the treatment of reception by Walter Benjamin and other figures associated with the Frankfurt School. For both Jauss and Benjamin, reception is a dynamic process in which meaning is not just passively received but also actively produced. Tracking the fragmentations, mediations, and transformations of Mesopotamia through the extraordinary range of audiences active in Western Europe thus involves not only gauging reactions to the original artifacts or considering the circumstances of their display (important as these are), but also considering the mediation, reproduction, and emulation of the objects in contemporary work. Accordingly, we will consider in the context of reception, in addition to the ancient artifacts themselves, an entire range of emulatory production, which is almost a cross-section of contemporary popular and visual culture: poems and panoramas, jewelry and bibelots, theatre, prints, sculpture, architecture, and, most of all, painting.

Mesopotamia as a subject brings up another basic theoretical area from which I draw throughout this book: postcolonial studies. As the past two decades have seen a surge of studies of nineteenth-century exoticism, we may now be at a point where it is worthwhile reconsidering the provisional assumptions under which some of this work was undertaken. If the initial fallout from Edward Said's *Orientalism* did much to raise the topic of the exotic among art historians, the intellectual challenge begun in his work has (with some exceptions) still been largely deferred. My focus is more prospective than retrospective, but this study works also to highlight roads not taken in earlier scholarship, as suggested at points in the first and second chapters.

But reception also must consider Assyria in a further field of representation, which is located between artifacts themselves and the sort of beholding represented by Freud: language. Mesopotamia also provided terms of reference, floating signifiers applied in a variety of contexts. The discursive construction of Assyria is a reception in its own right, an ineffable and essential component of the whole, located both within and beyond particular objects.

COURBET'S BEARD AND "THE MEMBER FROM NINEVEH"

... "myself painting, showing the Assyrian profile of my head." Gustave Courbet's description of himself at the center of his *Atelier* of 1855 is among the most famous self-descriptions in all of nineteenth-century art. While it has often been taken as evidence of Courbet's peculiar bravado, referring to his exaggerated features and long, tapered beard, this remark has rarely been considered in connection with the currency of Assyria. Yet Courbet's offhanded remark would have been incomprehensible only a decade earlier and bears a peculiar relation to Assyria itself.

Layard ultimately spent most of his life involved in politics, capitalizing upon his fame gained as archaeologist. In the witty, confrontational realm of Parliamentary debate, he was sometimes addressed as "the Member from Nineveh." In both the cases of Courbet and Layard, Assyria is a discursive site, an idea founded on a complex of references and expectations. Each reference takes on further meaning through analysis of its enunciatory context, the milieu in which it is spoken. We will see in Courbet's case, in the third chapter, how his description crystallizes the fundamentally constrained situation in which the image of Assyria circulated in mid-nineteenth-century France. Layard's moniker, in the same way, accords with the archaeologist's appropriation of the fame of his discoveries, a pattern explored especially in the fifth chapter. The later adoption by Josephin Péladan of both Mesopotamian form and identity considered in the seventh chapter, marks a fascinating combination of features of these earlier situations.

As these examples attest, the term Assyrian was applied to many more things than artifacts in a museum. The very nature and pattern of this discursive appropriation says much about the perceived identity and nature of the various referents. Looking at Mesopotamia from the standpoint of reception must also involve considering the iterations of the very term, however "impurely" and contingently they apply. The concept of hybridity, as developed in postcolonial theory particularly by Homi Bhabha, is of great importance in this respect. Not only does hybridity focus exactly on the development of the kinds of discursive permutations that are of interest here, but it also speaks directly to the nature of power relations involved. Despite the often very different, and even conflicting, interests and capabilities that were brought to the objects, the imbalance of power between nineteenth-century Mesopotamia and the dominant European colonial powers that appropriated its buried antiquities suffuses this entire history and is among the few common assumptions about the place that can be found throughout Europe.

The relative continuity of an imperialist relation between Europe and the lands beyond it is fundamental to understanding the reception of Mesopotamia. But I am most concerned with the ways in which even this assumption of power is itself variously transformed and turned to different functions by the different audiences

involved. For this reason, the greatest attention in this book is paid to the one sort of interpretation of Mesopotamian artifacts that evoked the greatest controversy in Europe itself: the vexed, persistent question of its aesthetic potential. More than any other approach, tracking the reception of Mesopotamia during the period of these acquisitions, not only in art, but as art itself, illuminates its complex treatment. In the process, the West itself is revealed as far from monolithic. The aesthetic reception of ancient Assyrian and other Mesopotamian artifacts was staged in realms of conflict and contestation through which even the objects themselves were fundamentally mediated. At the same time, however new and striking were the artifacts, they were identified, and ultimately assimilated, largely as contributions to preexistent schemes and suppositions about art, history, and Mesopotamian culture. I say "largely," but not completely, in the same way Bhabha describes the stance toward power of the colonialist mimic as "the same, but different."⁷ For even as the artifacts of ancient Mesopotamia were located within the larger European worldview, they also worked subtly to amend that view, especially in the changing estimations of their aesthetic potential.

Most postcolonial studies focus on modern cultures and objects relatively contemporaneous to them. Here, by contrast, we are concerned with the lesser examined area of historical exoticism, focusing on the modern reception of ancient artifacts. Accordingly, the overlap of history and exoticism must also be examined in its own right, as treated at the end of the first chapter.

Having filtered Freud's dream-like wonder over Mesopotamian discoveries through some of the concerns of this book, we can restate it more explicitly in the words of Walter Benjamin. Though this book has roots in a number of theoretical and methodological areas, its greatest debt is to Benjamin. The start of Benjamin's 1939 prospectus for his "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (now better known as the Arcades Project) describes succinctly the material system and ideological effect of the accretion of artifacts. It is worth quoting at length:

The subject of this book is an illusion expressed by Schopenhauer in the following formula: to seize the essence of history, it suffices to compare Herodotus and the morning newspaper. What is expressed here is a feeling of vertigo characteristic of the nineteenth century's conception of history. It corresponds to a viewpoint according to which the course of the world is an endless series of facts congealed in the form of things. The characteristic residue of this conception is what has been called the "History of Civilization," which makes an inventory, point by point, of humanity's life forms and creations. The riches thus amassed in the acarium [i.e., storehouse] of civilization henceforth appear as though identified for all time. This conception of history minimizes the fact that such riches owe not only their existence but also their transmission to a constant effort of society – an effort, moreover, by which these riches are strangely altered. Our investigation proposes to show how, as a consequence of this reifying representation of

civilization, the new forms of behavior and the new economically and technologically based creations that we owe to the nineteenth century enter the universe of a phantasmagoria. These creations undergo this "illumination" not only in a theoretical manner, by an ideological transposition, but also in the immediacy of their perceptible presence.⁸

Benjamin proceeds immediately to the arcades themselves, the locus of the new objects, and social norms he wished to examine. But his analysis can be applied equally well to the arcade-like grandeur of the museum, which was also a fundamental product of the nineteenth century. Indeed, Benjamin's "universe of a phantasmagoria" directly summons Freud's own Assyrian dreamworld in the Louvre. Freud's reaction is conceived through the gathering of "riches" in the museum as "aerarium of civilization," and staged directly in reaction to "the immediacy of their perceptible presence."

Freud's concern (in a private letter, after all) is framed purely in terms of individual beholding. Taking Benjamin's more systematic view, we cannot ignore his key observation that the "transmission" of these treasures "through a constant effort of society" leaves them "strangely altered." This observation applies not only to "actual" beholding, but even more to beholding mediated by the machinery of reproduction, which flourished in the later nineteenth century and was a concern of Benjamin's as well. Taking this cue from Benjamin, we will examine in detail the crucial role of contemporary reproductive technology – particularly that of the illustrated magazine – in the circulation of Mesopotamia in all three countries to be considered.

Also explicit in Benjamin's formulation is a critique of a formulaic "History of Civilization." Focus on the work of reception undermines the "endless series of facts" of a positivist and totalizing world history. It presents a stance structurally complementary to that of hybridity in postcolonial theory. Both highlight varieties of transformation, brushing conventional arrangements of history and power against the grain.

WE MUST, HOWEVER, defer this consideration to the following chapter, which presents in more detail the theoretical and methodological concerns of this study. For now, Benjamin's analysis orients Freud's perception within the context of this book.

This book consists of eight chapters that are divided into two parts. The first part of this book is devoted to articulating a theoretical and methodological approach to exoticism and reception, which then opens onto Mesopotamian exoticism. The first chapter draws particularly on studies in artistic exoticism, reception theory, the Frankfurt school, and postcolonial studies. The second chapter begins to insert the analysis of exoticism as reception into nineteenth-century European art and

visual culture. In the process, it examines some key images of Mesopotamia from the period before the archaeological discoveries, analyzing the specific nature of Mesopotamia as a term of exoticist reference.

The second part of the book looks in detail at central milieux of Mesopotamian reception. The third chapter deals with the strangely unenthusiastic French reception at mid-century of Botta's Assyrian finds, before turning, in chapters four through six, to the remarkably deep and sustained English reaction to Layard's finds of similar objects at roughly the same time. Considering, in turn, such topics as the institutional history of the objects in the British Museum, patterns of publicity for Layard and the finds, and emulatory Mesopotamian production from the second half of the nineteenth century, we find many of the same themes as in France, yet now transformed. In the final two chapters, we recross the channel to consider the reception of further Ancient Near Eastern discoveries, in later nineteenth-century France and early twentieth-century Germany. The later French milieu far surpasses that of Botta's time in its interest and specificity about the Ancient Near East, while it also splits the identity of Mesopotamia between Assyria and other referents derived from more recent French archaeological successes. The German milieu, developed around the German excavations at Babylon, presents another set of priorities, which in many ways brings this account full circle. In an atmosphere constrained by physical limitations and ideological pressures, we find a retreat to the identity of Assyria, despite the actual German discovery of the one site, Babylon, with potential to rival Assyria (and its capital, Nineveh) in the Western imagination. Further, the very nature of visual circulation in early twentieth-century Berlin is transmuted in a way that fundamentally undermines the nineteenth-century technologies of presence that had driven the situation begun with Layard and Botta.

This book, then, belongs to the genre known in German as "Antikenrezeption." It focuses not on ancient Mesopotamian art itself so much as what was made of it, engaging the varied, complex, and even perverse fragmentations of form and meaning that accrue in reception. Dedicated to several moments in Europe's reception of Mesopotamia, its methodological tools are designed to illuminate the subtle and shifting nature of the many transformations involved in Mesopotamia's European reception and the (still continuing) shocks of its assimilation.

ONE

EXOTICISM AS SYSTEM

... the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the orient from something into something else. ...

Edward Said, *Orientalism*¹

Comparison from Montaigne: Bees buzz back and forth among flowers, but what they make of them is honey, it is no longer thyme or marjoram. Thus one borrows things from others in order to mix up and transform them, in order to make a work of one's own.

from Ingres' notebook²

EXOTIC DEFINITIONS

Though drawn from very different sources, a single concept connects these quotations. Central to both is a process of fundamental change, which could be deemed conversion by Said or transformation for Ingres. This juxtaposition of observations by a nineteenth-century artist known for Orientalist painting and a modern scholar of Orientalism as cultural phenomenon suggests that the Western apprehension of realms beyond the West shares a basic structural feature with artistic representation as such. Put most broadly, this book is an exploration of the meanings and varieties of these very transformations as manifest in a particular topic that overlaps the concerns of the scholar of Western knowledge of the nebulous "East" and the historian of European art: the Western discovery, display, circulation, interpretation, and emulation of Mesopotamian antiquities from the 1840s through the early twentieth century.

The majority of this book is devoted to the specific circumstances of the reception of Mesopotamia. At the same time, I do not want to lose sight of the broader structural and theoretical implications of the topic. For that reason, we start by situating the study in fundamentally theoretical and methodological terms. In a

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way strangely parallel to an exoticist travelogue, we begin by mapping the terrain and setting a course in the tropics of theory.

Exoticism, by its very nature, is a challenge to definition. It is not an immutable class of objects so much as a mode of apprehension. Thriving on difference, looking toward, and beyond, the edges of Western awareness, I approach exoticism as a Western attempt to flirt with Western expectations. While the necessary strangeness of the exotic subject marks its authenticity to a Western audience, the same feature also fundamentally complicates the subject's transmission and intelligibility.

This is as much a question of practical concern in exoticist representation as abstruse reasoning. A few examples can help to define the issues at stake. The working of the exotic was vexing already to Lady Mary Montagu in the mid-eighteenth century. Her *Letters from the Levant* state precisely the paradox of apprehending the exotic subject. Many of her lengthy descriptions are detailed, sympathetic, and seemingly artless. Yet, fearing her reader won't quite believe her description of the court of Constantinople, Montagu noted:

We travelers are in very hard circumstances: If we say nothing but what has been said before us, we are dull and we have observed nothing. If we tell any thing new, we are laughed at as fabulous and romantic. ...³

Montagu's letters, like all exoticist representations verbal or visual, work to fit between these two audience reactions, between being deemed unexceptional and being deemed unbelievable. This passage in particular makes explicit the terms through which such communication takes place. Three principles are manifest in it, which guide the current study.

First, and most obviously, exoticism is a process. It is constituted by, and cannot be seen apart from, a system of circulation. Montagu's consciousness of audience underlines that exoticist artifacts, whether visual or verbal, are not created in a vacuum, but rather employ terms of reference from the particular, historically specific, Western audiences they address.

Second, Montagu also suggests more specifically how the exotic artifact is assimilated by its audience. Exoticist representation inevitably resists expectation to a certain degree. The exotic subject cannot only be precisely what is already expected by the audience. Yet just as inevitably, as Montagu also suggests, it cannot be totally different. This resistance, in other words, is never complete. Rather, the exoticist object is ultimately (even if only provisionally) assimilated in the very norm it begins by challenging.

Individual representations vary considerably in the amount of resistance they offer to their milieu of reception. Often, those that offer only a token resistance are accepted most quickly, though particular moments may be ripe for uniquely


strange and challenging representations. Further, as the term “resistance” suggests, there can be social and even political consequences within the process. Thus a full understanding of exoticist representation should attempt not only to identify norms of expectation, but also the shock or challenge presented by a given representation. It must also locate this sort of interpretive crux within its social-political context.

Third, combining the two points, it becomes clear that exoticism is not a matter of limpid *transmission*, but rather one of representational *transformation*. Thus, even if one imagines that Montagu described the Turkish harem she visited precisely and with complete objectivity, her presentation of it to a Western reader still recontextualizes the scene and opens it to a far different representational fortune (one of whose consequences for nineteenth-century art we shall note presently).

The theme of exoticist transformation can be especially evident in matters of visualization. Some instances in visual art offer striking testimony to the power of transformation effected by the ultimate Western destination of exoticist representations of the East. James Tissot’s illustrations of the Old Testament, for example, were backed up by his extensive visits to Palestine. Yet the artist freely described his disappointment at the pitiful size of the actual mountain he was shown as Calvary. He also disclosed the subsequent exaggeration of his depiction of it, made so as not to disappoint his viewers.⁴ Similarly, as Lee Johnson has shown conclusively, Delacroix’s *Sultan of Morocco* bears little physical resemblance to the site of the event portrayed, which the artist witnessed and sketched. Delacroix’s painting, conceived as a conventional Salon work, owes much of its power to the transformation it effects.⁵ The analysis of exoticism as process, then, must offer a perspective as open to changes as to continuities. It must value “inauthentic” invention as much as precise transcription. Indeed, it must see that neither is absolute, but rather that the two are interdependent.

One further distinction among exoticisms now presents itself, that of synchronic and diachronic. In analyzing the works of Montagu, Tissot, or Delacroix, one might inquire into the work’s place among prevailing norms of language, ideology, representation, and medium in the writer/artist’s time. In such cases, discursive norms of travel writing, popular religious imagery, or Salon painting, among other things, might provide some basis for understanding the representational transformations, negotiating the distance between the writer/artist and the Western audience, involved with these particular artifacts. Such cases, which form the majority of recent scholarship, pursue a *synchronic* study, investigating a cultural moment at a single time.

But there is a complementary form of study, equally important for this book, which further elaborates exoticist representation. The *diachronic* study is one that follows a track between two cultural moments separated in time. Thus Montagu’s harem description became an essential source, more than a century later, for



1. Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, *The Turkish Bath*, 1862. Paris, Louvre. © Giraudon/Art Resource, NY.

Ingres’ influential Orientalist painting, *The Turkish Bath* (see Fig. 1).⁶ In diachrony, Montagu’s description is transformed, and not only from text to image. It is now hardly the transcript of a woman’s experience, but rather the stimulus to an unbounded and perverse erotic imagination of a male artist, who had never set foot in the land depicted.

The essential point here is that exoticist reception has both diachronic and synchronic aspects, each of which can be used to measure representational transformation, as a term circulates through both time and space. The fullest accounting of any exoticist artifact is one that elaborates its reception through both forms of distance.

Diachrony, however, has further importance here. It is often involved in especially “inauthentic” works (i.e., ones without a direct claim to experience on the part of the artist). In this book, I will be particularly interested in a class of exoticist imagery of necessarily diachronic reference, one for which the maker could not claim direct experience: historical exoticism. Delacroix’s *Death of Sardanapalus* (see Fig. 7) is paramount here: it is a work that takes as its subject the death of the ancient Assyrian monarch. Delacroix’s work is among the most famous of nineteenth-century Orientalist paintings, and perhaps the most influential work of Assyrian imagery in modern times. Yet its significance for conceptualizing exoticist representation, and the importance of the vast class of images to which it belongs, have rarely been acknowledged, much less analyzed.

With a brief intimation now of the range of the nature and range of the exoticist system, I proceed to the main project of this chapter: forging a methodology to

examine exoticism as process. This first chapter is thus unique in that it will be concerned little with Mesopotamia itself, but rather will draw on the preceding examples (and others) as a way of delimiting the working of the exotic. Only at the very end of this chapter will we turn toward the nineteenth-century context of Mesopotamian reception itself. Subsequently, the concerns enunciated in this first chapter will be developed in the second chapter into more specific questions about historical exoticism, nineteenth-century archaeology, and the image of Assyria.

THIS CHAPTER IS divided into five sections. Each presents a complex of methodological and interpretive elements. Together, they articulate a structure that will be employed throughout this book. In the rest of this first section, I will briefly pursue the questions of definition already begun. The second section turns specifically to exoticism in art historical literature. Its tendencies are assessed as methods for illuminating the exoticist process.

With the third section of this chapter, we expand into a larger field. I consider the work of Hans Robert Jauss, a central theorist of literary reception, which I then supplement with the more politically inflected conception of Walter Benjamin. Both offer essential, and complementary, insights into exoticist process. The fourth section turns to postcolonial theory, which is an obvious, but underused, field for the scholar of visual exoticism. The works of Edward Said and Homi Bhabha offer central texts for conceptualizing the exoticist process and the kinds of resistance and transformation involved in its circulation. A final section on theorizing history is concerned largely with another aspect of Benjamin's work as well as that of Reinhard Koselleck. This last section turns toward historical reference as a crux of exoticist significance. As a whole, then, this first chapter introduces the language and model, which underlie the historical investigations of Mesopotamia in the second part of this book.

TO CONTINUE THE argument of this first section, having now looked at a few historical examples of exoticism, let us consider defining them:

EXOTICISM. From the point of view of esthetics, "exoticism" may be defined as the imitation of elements in alien cultures that differ from native tradition. The taste for the exotic feeds on cultures that are experienced as distant and different, whether remote in space or time.⁷

These lines by Enrico Crispolti are decades old, but they begin what is still one of the few genuinely detailed attempts at a basic definition of artistic exoticism.⁸ Further, they articulate what remains a dominant conception of the exotic.

In this definition, the difference between "native" and "alien" is tied to distance. Difference and distance together are subsumed under the term "remote." Exoticism

as a corpus, then, becomes a repertory of kinds of remoteness. Indeed, the "exo-" of exoticism might be taken as a marker of this very quality, a difference accompanied by a distance. Michel de Certeau calls this "the *a priori* of difference" in which the exotic "is presumed to be different from the place assigned it in the beginning by the discourse of culture."⁹ The most basic exoticist arrangement, then, is one whose essential features are two distinct cultures separated by a palpable remoteness.

But how can remoteness also be present to be (as Crispolti states) "experienced"? The traditional ideal of the exotic, that is, demands at the same time both distance and proximity, both absence and presence. The definition invokes both without nuance or specified relation. A fuller model of exoticism, then, must present also a specific process by which the various agents are related.

Even the most seemingly obvious and unmediated artifacts deserve treatment in terms of process. Coffee, for example, was once an exotic and even threatening drink, introduced to Europe in the seventeenth century through the Ottoman Turks. Yet today, even a knowledge of its history or the occasional schematic moors or pyramids or donkeys that appear in coffee advertising cannot restore that condition.¹⁰ Likewise, a painting, such as that by Larry Rivers based on a pack of Camel cigarettes, is hardly a reference to the exotic origin of tobacco when it was introduced in Western Europe (even before coffee). It is more properly an acknowledgment of the banality of a cigarette package. But nothing is banal by itself. Rather, such objects are the endpoint of a lengthy history of making the distant and different proximate and intelligible. Tobacco is a particularly striking example, because despite its New World origins, after European transplantation it acquired an identity in the West as originating elsewhere.¹¹

While the traditions of alien and native may seem fixed for a given observer at a given moment, then, these distinctions are not permanent. Coffee (or tobacco) as an object is not purely alien or native. Rather, coffee in the fourteenth century is different from coffee in the nineteenth century. Hence, within the exoticist framework of cultures and differences, one can see that objects migrate, while their meanings and identities are modified and transformed in the process.

To fully establish the processual definition of exoticist knowledge requires another, related modification to the initial definition. While it may be true that "From the point of view of [formalist] aesthetics" exoticism is associated with the "imitation of elements in alien cultures," a more systematic definition, which would leave room to sketch also the process around individual, disjunct artifacts, would need to associate exoticism with *reference* to elements in alien cultures.

This is an important distinction from the standpoint of reception. Does Western coffee imitate that of the East? Although the term at least has a concrete referent, and the word itself is derived from Arabic, one can posit little beyond a family resemblance. Moreover, nineteenth-century Western exoticism is replete with

such almost completely imaginary representations as the eroticized harem and the odalisque with problematic resemblance to anything in contemporary Eastern realities. Ingres' transformation of Montagu embodies this very point.¹² Such images of harem and odalisques largely imitate each other in their putative reference to Eastern practice, but they belong just as much to the exoticist corpus. They refer to the East without precisely imitating anything of it.

A formulation of exoticist reference, emphasizing "the beholder's share" in Western exoticist representation, would underline, in Homi Bhabha's term, the "temporalization" of exoticist knowledge—its unfixing, reflexive, performative nature.¹³ Rather than claiming to identify the exotic artifact solely through a supposed correspondence with an alien culture, this amounts to acknowledging that the exotic subject, such as the harem, establishes its own authenticity through adjustment to the norms of its milieu of reception, just as Montagu suggests.¹⁴ Exotic artifacts are about themselves and the Western societies in which they circulate at least as much as any extrinsic culture they claim to represent.

Finally, as much of the preceding discussion suggests, the relations of difference through which the exotic is communicated are not bi-directional, but hierarchically structured. Crispolti's definition is deliberately nonspecific, but it is actually devoted primarily to Western exoticism, so that "native tradition" stands for that small portion of the globe that was the West in the nineteenth century (considerably smaller than today's West) while "alien cultures" are those of the vast elsewhere called generically the East. While anthropologists assure us that virtually all cultures have their "others," the legacy of past and present colonialism, imperialism, economic dependency, and similar factors guarantees an extraordinary asymmetry in the interchange between East and West. Despite its ostensible impartiality, Crispolti's definition betrays this imbalance in noting that exoticism "feeds" on other cultures. It is tacitly acknowledged that in exoticism, Western culture is not on an equal footing with the object of its concern. Part of my goal here will be to highlight the workings of power within a broader view of exoticist process.

But what is the best point from which to view this process? If there is a hinge in the process, a place where the exotic is produced, regulated, and disseminated, it lies not in the point of its purported reference, but in that of its conception and consumption: the West itself. Thus Jean-Pierre Leduc-Adine deems exoticism "primarily a phenomenon of reception." This conception has recently been articulated more systematically by Peter Mason.

The exotic . . . [he argues] is not something that exists prior to 'discovery.' It is the very act of discovery which produces the exotic as such, and produces it in various degrees of wildness or domestication. . . . As a construct, the exotic is always up for renegotiation; as an invention, it is always open to reinvention; as a field of forces in which Self and Other constitute one another in a lopsided relation, it is always open to contestation.¹⁵

Mason highlights the centrality of exoticism as a continuing process of reception. It is just this genealogy of renegotiation, reinvention, and contestation that I want to examine here. Indeed, through an emphasis on reception, we can most directly examine the construction of authenticity and the conditions that make the exoticist referent possible. Each of the examples with which we have begun—Montagu's consciousness of audience like Tissot's and Delacroix's adjustment of imagery to established norms—can be most directly framed as questions of reception. In each case, an object of representation is amended to fit the expectations of a specific Western audience, whether a specific correspondent, Biblical believer, or salon viewer. Further, the writer/artist's claim to having actual experience of the subject, which is true in all three cases, is no guarantee of the truth of the ultimate rendering. While production (the artist's gathering of representational "raw material") is clearly a part of the process, these cases point to the formative role of reception in the final work.

Finally, I must address a question of terminology. I use the term "exoticism" throughout to describe my study. I mean by this to avoid emphasis on the vexing binarisms (of which Orient versus Occident is only the first) of the earlier forms of postcolonial criticism, as derived from Edward Said's first book. This is an important development in the past decade of postcolonial studies, but still less than fully established in art history.¹⁶ In fact, as we shall see, even Said's initial formulation was rather more complex than has often been made out.

I choose the term exoticism to build in this resistance to binarism as well as to distinguish my subject from conventional Orientalism. However imaginary the Orient-Occident distinction, its terms, after all, refer to established geographic locales. "Exotic," by contrast, has no such obvious complement and refers somewhat more indiscriminately, and nonhierarchically, to a generic elsewhere. This is key to the new rise of the term exotic in a variety of scholarship.¹⁷

The term exotic is not merely useful for its resistance to binarism, but also for its inclusiveness. The term's traditional reference is distinct from that of Orientalism and is usually assigned to the most imaginary and ephemeral things, from medieval marginalia of fantastic beasts to Victorian china of vague, but uncategorizable subjects.¹⁸ They are deemed exotic, because more specifically delimited terms (not only Orientalism or Primitivism, but also Chinoiserie, Turquerie, Espagnolism, etc.) cannot be applied.¹⁹ In this book, however, I will use exoticism to refer to the whole complex of references and artifacts, without distinction between subcategories, including, without privileging, the putatively realistic or objective.

At the same time, I use the term exoticism with a full awareness of its complex history and problematic nature. The term has been mocked and dismissed by founders of contemporary postcolonial writing as far back as Aimé Césaire's scathing *Discourse on Colonialism* of 1955.²⁰ Indeed, it is useful here just because it

is problematic. Just as Césaire referred in another context (certainly not without irony) to his own work as exoticism, the term cannot be simply avoided, but must rather be understood as one under critical examination.²¹

The exoticist construct has a further advantage for our current purpose. Unlike Orient or Occident, not only does exoticism make no claim to be assigned to a particular place, it also does not privilege location in space over that in time. Exoticism thus explicitly opens up analysis to works of historical subject matter, temporally distant from the modern West. Among them, of course, is the representation of ancient Mesopotamia, the primary focus of this book.

We have now established the outline, at least, of a definition of exoticism, suggesting both how the exotic can work and how best to approach it. We now move toward elaborating the tools to develop this analysis.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXOTICISM AND ART HISTORICAL METHOD

In art history, one of the most common ways of treating the imagery of nineteenth-century exoticism remains to evaluate it for its potential as a straightforward, truthful rendering of a scene unfamiliar to most Western viewers. This approach is based on the assumption stated directly in an exhibit of 1982, that “the unifying characteristic of nineteenth-century Orientalism was its attempt at documentary realism.”²²

This “mimeticist” account of nineteenth-century exoticism assumes a perceptual congruence between original site and created image, which seemingly enables the viewer to share objectively the experience of the artist.²³ Mimeticism approaches its objects as if they stand outside of the influence of process or transformation. In fact, even established traditional scholars of pictorial Orientalism have affirmed the insufficiency of the mimetic account.²⁴ The overt examples of visual transformation by Tissot and Delacroix with which we began this chapter (works made to guard against the viewer’s even knowing the artist’s actual experience), the submerged position of historical exoticism, as well as the ever more heterogeneous range of works chosen for exhibitions of nineteenth-century artistic exoticism; all make apparent the difficulty of maintaining a mimeticist account in light of the continuing fluidity of exoticist imagery.²⁵ Still, the mimetic assumption is important here as a sort of cultural baseline, which we will find throughout nineteenth-century discourse. In the next chapter, probing in more detail some scholarship of the past decades, we will also briefly consider mimeticism’s later twentieth-century formulation, around the “rediscovery” of the work of Gérôme.

Here, though, confining ourselves to the most directly theoretical and methodological aspects of this topic, we can already see alternatives for theorizing visual exoticism within art history itself. Though it said very little about visual art itself, surely one of the appeals of Said’s book to art historians was that it offered a broader


framework in which to consider the exotic. The strongest and best-known Saidian approach in English is Linda Nochlin’s “The Imaginary Orient,” written specifically as a response to the exhibition that stressed “documentary realism.”²⁶ For Nochlin “the degree of realism (or lack of it) in individual Orientalist images can hardly be discussed without some attempt to clarify *whose* reality we are talking about.” In line with Said, Nochlin’s analysis is inflected with an awareness of political ideology and dominance. Her attention to conflict in the preceding passage forms part of a larger questioning of Western motivations for Eastern representation: the political history of colonization and domination behind the conventional Orientalist image. Nochlin’s questioning of the a priori judgment of truthfulness necessitates an awareness of the construction of Orientalist imagery. For Nochlin, then, exoticist images do not exist by themselves. Rather, they are epiphenomenal, instantiated nodes in a complex of motives, interests, and power.

Nochlin’s essay has had a profound impact. It succeeded, convincingly and eloquently, in bringing to art historical study the kind of approach articulated by Said in *Orientalism*. From the current viewpoint, though, Nochlin’s essay also presents two difficulties. First, it is focused, understandably, on largely the same corpus of images of the contemporary East as the previous literature. More importantly, in a way characteristic of Said’s earlier work, it too presents the relation of East and West as a binary, “either/or” arrangement. We will see, in considering postcolonial theory, how criticism of Said’s monolithic conceptions of both East and West has led to more recent emphasis on hybridity. But such alternative views have other roots as well. A more radical decentering of the exoticist corpus, as well as a more direct confrontation with the imaginary processes of the exotic, can be found in the lesser-known work of Michel Thevoz and Olivier Richon. Thevoz and Richon offer another sort of model of exoticism as process, allied to, but distinct from, that of Nochlin. Not the least of their innovations is the highlighting of imagery of historical exoticism, and, indeed, replacement of “Orientalism” with the very term “exoticism.”

Richon’s 1985 article, “Representation, the Harem, and the Despot,” is one of the few in English to take account of the important early work of Michel Thevoz. Thevoz’s analysis of Charles Gleyre’s “imaginary realism” precisely counters the mimetic account of exoticism.

If Orientalism deserves its name, it is not for having irradiated European painting with the colors of the Orient, but, to the contrary, having “orientalized” them according to the romantic dreams of Paris.²⁷

Exoticism is thus an action of encoding, emanating from a center of power. It is a process that acts on both contemporary and historical material. Thevoz well



2. Jean Jules Antoine Lecomte de Noüy, *Ramses in His Harem*, 1885. Courtesy of the Fine Art Society PLC, London.

notes the frequent assertions of Orientalist travelers that the East is a land without history, where the ancients can still be met, “a natural reserve of unchanging-ness [intemporalité].”²⁸ Thus temporal reference becomes an inherent aspect of exoticist representation.

Richon’s essay focuses on a single work, Lecomte de Noüy’s *Ramses in His Harem*, (see Fig. 2). This subject combines the two subjects we have found most resistant to realist accounts of the exotic: the figure of the ancient past and the self-validating, imaginary harem. Richon aims “to show to what extent Western representations of the Orient address the West itself, as if the Occident attempted to go away from itself and look at itself from an imaginary vanishing point, represented by the orient.”²⁹

Rather than tracking the exoticist construct through a political and social web, as Nochlin does, Richon stresses the imaginary transformations involved in the production of the obsessively veristic. Both Thevoz and Richon organize nineteenth-century Orientalist painting around the poles of the “colonial” of Gros and the “libidinal” of Bonington. Exoticism is thus construed to have been ushered into the nineteenth century with Gros’ propagandistic images of the exploits of Napoleon in the Middle East and Bonington’s works demonstrating him to have been “the

first specialist in odalisques and harem scenes.” Notably, both of these are the works of artists who never left Western Europe.

All subsequent Orientalist painters can be seen to oscillate between these two poles, until the end of the 19th century. Consequently, when countless painters actually went to the Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt, in order to paint from direct observation, they started to look for models conforming to those of their predecessors. Needless to say such models were not to be located in “reality” but had eventually to be fantasised.³⁰

The exoticist image here stands at the farthest possible remove from the social and physical actuality of the East. Through this approach there emerges an “inner” fantastical history of the Orientalist artistic construct to parallel the “outer” social/ideological one stressed by Nochlin. Whereas Nochlin presents the possibility of establishing competing realities to characterize competing political groups (in the kind of binarism first conceived by Said), Thevoz and Richon seem to question *any* pure correspondence between exoticist imagery and an unquestioned external reality in an arrangement that is not only one of paired oppositions, but also of complex and idiosyncratic fracturings. Characteristically, Nochlin’s focus is on artists who visited the East but “misrepresent” it, while Richon and Thevoz highlight those who have never visited in the first place.

Insofar as Thevoz/Richon and Nochlin treat the mediation of the exotic and the conditions of its possibility, they both assess exoticism as a representational process. For neither approach does the Orient exist by itself, or indeed exist at all, except through its Western beholders. Thus, they also agree that in the directed realm of exoticism, in which the East is labeled and regulated by Western mediators and viewers, study of exoticist process inevitably becomes study of exoticist reception: its circulation and evaluation by Western audiences. Further, Richon’s unique choice of a historical image intimates the systemic difficulty of historical imagery for realist analyses of exoticism.

My approach lies between these two models of artistic exoticism as reception. As it is focused not solely on traditional artistic media such as painting, rather extending far into the varied media of nineteenth-century visual culture, it must be situated more broadly in cultural theory. We thus pursue into other frames the fundamental theoretical questions that underlie the treatment of exoticist imagery in Nochlin and Richon/Thevoz. In each case, we define our approach through a similar strategy of location *between* positions. Jauss and Benjamin, Said and Bhabha, will function in much the same way as Nochlin and Richon here.

This searching for betweenness is a way of illuminating the dialectical play of difference that takes place in reception. The circulation between objects and viewers necessitates a certain degree of homogeneity, or there could be no process of circulation, no common languages of evaluation. Yet there is also room for audience

resistance and representational transformation, as the nature of an audience's reaction can change over time in a given place, or can vary, subtly or dramatically, as different audiences and institutions bring different expectations even at the same time.

The nineteenth century is an especially fertile field for the study of reception in terms of resistance and transformation. An age of burgeoning and competing constituencies, at the beginning of an explosion of visual media, of modes of communication and commodification, it offers a rich array of channels for communication and transformation of exoticist subjects. The following section will turn the specifics of reception theory to this question, but one point remains within the disciplinary context of art history.

Issues of production and intention continue to dominate art historical study. Yet surely even the very existence today of (some) art of the past is testimony not only to its production, but also to its favorable reception. Art objects themselves change over time, and even their material fates are largely in the hands of their current audiences. Museums of art and antiquities make vast expenditures of time, money, and expertise to make certain objects appear physically, visually, and even intellectually available, while simultaneously offering less support to others. The seemingly unmediated walk through the museum, in the presence of works of past times and distant cultures, is a fiction that does not negate the importance of reception, but rather testifies to its omnipresence. Both continuities and disjunctures in our knowledge of art depend absolutely on the agency of audiences.

This is the very observation of Benjamin noted in the introduction, that art treasures "owe not merely their existence but also their transmission to a constant effort on the part of society." We will see precisely this operation at work in museums in the second part of this book. But first we must examine more closely the intersection of reception and exoticism.

JAUSS AND BENJAMIN: RECEPTION, THEORY, AND RECEPTION THEORY

The approaches to exoticism of both Nochlin and Thevoz/Richon are fundamentally based in reception. In a complementary way, from a feminist standpoint, Lisa Tickner has insisted on the centrality of reception to this topic, stating "An adequate account of Orientalist painting will be obliged to begin 'over here' with the viewing subject."³¹ At the same time, though, it seems exoticism and reception have never been formally introduced. The goal of this section is to introduce more systematically the concerns and tools of reception study as embodied by two central theorists.

According to Reinhild Janzen, "the basic presupposition" of reception study "is that a work of art is a piece of dead matter until it is drawn into a dialectic, dynamic relationship with an observer."³² Janzen underlines, then, not just the relation of

work and viewer as object of reception study, but its mobility: a "dialectic, dynamic relationship." For Janzen, as in the pioneering work of Wolfgang Kemp, we are confronted by a range of processes, in which communication between viewer and object is ever changing, contingent, and mediated. Such an arrangement, in which producer, viewer, and even artifact can be continually evolving, is particularly appropriate to exoticism, inflected as it is by the (similarly free-floating) mediations of difference and contingencies of power relations.

Seeing the exotic through the methodology of reception, a fundamental feature emerges. An artwork circulates not just between viewers, but between cultures (and subcultures tied to particular audiences, classes, and genders) that such viewers embody. I shall call the interstices between these groups thresholds, sites for the management of difference. In coming to the Western audience from elsewhere, exoticist knowledge must negotiate such thresholds, be they primarily physical/practical in nature (e.g., geographical, economic, linguistic, or institutional limitations) or intellectual/theoretical (e.g., ideological, political, or didactic). The framework of reception offers, then, as a basic definition of the exoticist process, what might be called an epistemological itinerary, a traversing of thresholds. In this dynamic process of communication and transformation, each threshold functions to refigure as well as to transmit the exoticist object.

We have previously noted Said's assertion of the transformative nature of exoticist representation, as the Western Orientalist is "always converting" the object of his study. This feature in particular has led James Clifford to note that Said's position "flirts with a critique of representation as such."³³ This stance is perfectly appropriate to exoticism, a figuring of the very edge of Western representational possibility, for just this reason. While the scheme of exoticism as epistemological itinerary may well be applicable to visual representation in general, the transactions of exoticism draw these representational processes virtually to the limit. In fact, it is even a topos of nineteenth-century exoticist description that what it represents is not completely representable. To give just one example among many, Alphonse de Lamartine, describing the varied Syrians, Armenians, Greeks, and others encountered in a visit to the Middle East in the 1830s, noted, "We everywhere saw features so exquisitely pure and delicate, that the pencil of the most expert European artist could scarcely render justice to them."³⁴

This topos is a figure of what we have deemed the resistance of exoticist knowledge. Here it is addressed specifically to visual representation. But it is an instance of the larger, systematic challenge of the exotic. The greater the distance (geographic, chronological, cultural, etc.) between message and receiver, the more that can be garbled in transmission, and the greater the shock of recontextualization. Thus, while there might be an element of misrepresentation in virtually any system of representation, this mediative indeterminacy comes to the fore in exoticism, which

inevitably looks over and beyond the margins of Western production and knowledge.

The resistance and transformation of exoticist artifacts is a fundamental consequence of the system through which they are circulated. We must, then, look more closely at the exoticist process, first, as in the rest of this section, by means of reception theory, and second, in the following section, through some aspects of postcolonial theory, in order to fully assess the circulation of the exotic. In particular, we shall highlight the imperfections, indeterminacies, and contradictions of exoticist communication, on which is founded the resistance and transformation of exoticist artifacts. The theories of reception of Hans Robert Jauss and Walter Benjamin allow us to articulate this topic with some precision.

THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE structural and historical model of reception is surely that of Hans Robert Jauss, a founder of the “Constance school.” Jauss’s methodological centerpiece, the concept of a reader’s (or viewer’s) “horizon of expectation” [Erwartungshorizont], seems almost a perfect figure of the Western cultural framework into which the exotic subject is inserted. Extrapolating from Jauss, the horizon can be defined as the complex of cultural, ethical, and aesthetic expectations of readers or viewers at the historical moment of a text’s or object’s appearance.³⁵ Indeed, Jauss himself confirms the tie of reception and exoticism, noting that

... the concept of the horizon ... emerged as the problem confronted when trying to understand something alien despite the alterity of past and present horizons of expectation, or of one’s own and that of a culturally different world.³⁶

The horizon became what Jauss calls “the fundamental category” through considering the confrontation with “something alien.” Moreover, as an “alterity of past and present horizons of expectation,” the forms of distances through which the horizon becomes evident for Jauss are exactly identifiable with the types of exoticist distance noted earlier: diachronic and synchronic.

In Jauss’s system, every individual artifact bears a certain distance from the reader’s or beholder’s horizon of expectation, a distance comparable to the resistance (of artifact to viewer) we have noted. Ultimately, the interchange of object and audience can affect a “horizontal shift” modifying and/or extending audience expectations. Our awareness of a new work of art, that is, can change how we see not only the work itself, but also other works in relation to it. Further, for Jauss, once a work is so absorbed a “second shift” of defamiliarization is needed to see the object anew. The basic historical narrative of the second part of this book can be seen as an account of the impetus, development, and achievement of just such a horizontal shift. I hope that the analyses and juxtapositions of this text as a whole can contribute toward a second shift enabling us to see Mesopotamia, again for the first time, in its palpable alterity.

Jauss’s project inserts the horizon concept (derived from philosophical hermeneutics) into an empirical study, presenting what is essentially a theory of process. It is exemplary to us on this account, and particularly for two features. First, Jauss conceptualizes artworks as objects in perpetual interpretive flux.

A literary work is not an object that stands by itself and that offers the same view to each reader in every period. It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence. It is much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers.³⁷

Jauss here presents the object of his study as a coherent sum of heterogeneous parts, which, while seemingly fully available to all, is perceived differently by different audiences, in a resonant complexity that captures different beholders differently.

In practical terms, however, Jauss’s own judgments are relatively fixed (and indeed rather conservative).³⁸ Nonetheless, it is a consequence of his system that meaning is never generated with complete fixity and cannot be considered without the perceptual plurality of an audience-function. As Jauss himself puts it, a work is not an independent, disjunct *fact* so much as a continuing *event*.³⁹ In so doing, he not only temporalizes representation, but also opens it up to a sequence that can never be precisely controlled or confined to canonical boundaries.

Second, Jauss’s concern with the historical function of a work also leads to his description of a “triangle” of author, work, and public, so that a full account of a work’s meaning must be also an account of its circulation. “The historical life of a literary work is unthinkable without the active participation of its addressees. For it is only through the process of its mediation that the work enters into the changing horizon-of-experience.” Thus another central aspect of Jauss’s model is the mediation involved in processual shifts between thresholds (in our terms) of presentation, dissemination, and interpretation. His very goal is not only to describe this mediation, but also to follow it full circle into new production. “The perspective of the aesthetics of reception mediates between passive reception and active understanding, experience of norms, and new production.”⁴⁰ Thus, reception does not represent a single, bounded concern for Jauss, but rather the hinge of the larger scheme not only of circulation and reception, but also of production.

Jauss’s conception offers a clear framework for understanding the interrelation between native and alien in exoticism. In exoticism, Western culture itself functions as grand horizon of expectation, a hermeneutic envelope, so to speak, into which the mediated artifact is attracted. What we have called the “epistemological itinerary” of exoticism is the trajectory of the artifact as it moves in the horizon (and ultimately the horizon reshapes itself in response).

Jauss’s system is productive, coherent, and overdetermined. Although it presents the clearest and most trenchant tools for analyzing reception in its own terms, I

want to utilize Jauss's system in a less conventional way to allow interaction in a far broader social and ideological context.⁴¹ Thus we must expand Jauss's frame of inquiry to the sort of field of cultural production surveyed by Pierre Bourdieu, in which the autonomy of the artwork is fundamentally mediated by forces of exchange of cultural capital among institutions and publics.⁴² While Bourdieu's approach is not centered on reception, it presents an inspiration for fundamentally questioning cultural assumptions about given artists and works, including those of Jauss himself.

Jauss's ambivalence toward popular culture seems largely unexamined, for one thing, if not unjustifiable through his own premises. The distinction between high and popular modes of visual apprehension is just what the Assyrian discoveries worked to destabilize, as we shall see, rather than reinforce. Rather than assign these categories a priori, then, we must consider artifacts within the machinery of judgment in which such categories are derived. It is surely appropriate to historicize such a historically engaged method. Norman Bryson and Mieke Bal have particularly emphasized the need to locate reception study in a specific material locale, within the polymorphous welter of its semiotic play.⁴³ This demand again takes us beyond the system of Jauss. We thus must flesh out Jauss's sometimes bloodless generalized scheme with the specificity and complexity that can be emphasized by reference to the Frankfurt school: the thought of Adorno and, especially, Walter Benjamin.

Indeed, to conceive of reception as dialectical, as by Janzen, is to emphasize its Frankfurt ties. In practice, Jauss's analysis, particularly the working of the horizon, is tracked diachronically. The identity of individual agents (such as text and reader) is treated as relatively fixed and unproblematic as interaction over time is analyzed.

To fully enable our own view of the processes of exoticism as defined earlier, located at a junction of diachronic and synchronic approaches, we must supplement Jauss's construct. Reference to these figures of the Frankfurt school offers a valuable means to root the concept of the horizon in the specific and complex array of cultural interactions and contradictions that constitute the historical actuality of nineteenth-century audiences.

Both Jauss and the Frankfurt figures suggest views of exoticism as process. But whereas Jauss's is attuned especially to transformation in the sweep of time, the Frankfurt approach focuses on the nature of resistance and transformation in an individual moment.⁴⁴ Notably, whereas Jauss usually invokes a single, universalized horizon, the Frankfurt approach presents the possibility of differing, multiple horizons at a given moment (what I will call a "divided horizon") corresponding to divisions between agents and audiences. If Jauss seems to step back to conceive the larger picture, figures like Benjamin and Adorno could be said to step forward to consider at a given point just what that picture seems to be made of and under what constraints it is made at all. A public that is unified and generalized for Jauss can thus be treated via this closer view as one formed as much by divisions and

conflicts. As we shall see, this clearly applies to the contexts in which Mesopotamia was circulated in the period we will examine.

Adorno's often dyspeptic analyses of mass culture were inevitably involved with assessing them as processes. He stressed the essential role of mediation [Vermittlung], as experience is transferred and transformed in its dissemination. In his essay on the nature and effect of the art museum, a crucial locale for Assyria's reception, Adorno described the artwork as "neither a reflection of the soul or the embodiment of a Platonic Idea . . . but rather a 'force field' between subject and object."⁴⁵

Characteristically, Adorno's concept is forged in opposition, rejecting romantic and philosophic essentialism. Adorno's tantalizingly short "positive" description serves to emphasize the artwork's connection with human agency, as with Jauss, but also to highlight the work's extraordinary malleability within the system through which it is communicated. Compared to Jauss's triangle, in which the work is a term equal to creator and audience-member, Adorno offers an arrangement in which the humanly created object stands on far different ontological grounds than the more autonomous human agents. The work does not in any sense "speak for itself" for Adorno. To the contrary, at least in the context of the museum, he reminds us that what Jauss conceives of as a progressive, unproblematic link in the cultural chain is in fact a meeting of heterogeneous entities, an interrogation in which the mute artwork exists under the activating gaze of the viewer, having left the controlling hand of the producer. This is a crucial passage for our purposes, to which we will often have occasion to refer. Nonetheless, Adorno was generally little interested, and sometimes hostile, to highlighting the concept of reception, preferring to focus instead on artistic production, the other end of the force field he describes.⁴⁶

Walter Benjamin's work contains the kernel of a more nuanced system devoted specifically to the concerns of reception. Benjamin may be best known to art historians for the concept of the "aura" that characterizes certain unique objects.⁴⁷ Acknowledging the ineffable interaction between object and audience, Benjamin's aura bears a notable resemblance to Adorno's force field. But Benjamin's conception presents a far more subtle relation between artwork and viewer. As he puts it in a central passage on the aura, ". . . the painting we look at reflects back at us that of which the eyes will never have their fill."⁴⁸ This interplay of disparate reflections, suffused by the viewer's own desire, fits perfectly the scene of Freud's visit to the Louvre's Assyrian collections with which we have begun. Freud's enchantment with the Assyrian objects coexists with the very sense of unfulfillment described by Benjamin, taking place as it does in galleries which, as Freud states, "I must visit again several times."

Unlike Adorno, then, for Benjamin the proper context of a work could not be centralized in its production alone, but also encompasses the manifold fragmentations and recontextualizations of reception. From as early as his essay on "The

Task of the Translator," he consistently stressed that, "The idea of life and afterlife in works of art should be regarded with an unmetaphorical objectivity."⁴⁹

Benjamin's interest in reception stems from a rejection of the seamless, neo-Hegelian, progressive view of history he associated with historicism.

For the person who is concerned with works of art in a historically dialectical mode . . . it is their post-history which illuminates their pre-history as a continuous process of change. Works of art teach that person how their function outlives their creator and how his intentions are left behind. They demonstrate how the reception of the work by its contemporaries becomes a component of the effect which a work has upon us today.⁵⁰

Adopting a materialist stance similar to the one Marx used to oppose Hegel, Benjamin saw his own position as that of the "historical materialist." In this manner, "The historical materialist explodes the epoch out of its reified 'historical continuity. . . .'"⁵¹ This, then, is the foundation of Benjamin's case for the importance of reception study. Our apprehension of art objects is no more stable than the history of which we are a part. The changes can be seen as incremental, as current interpretations bear relation to older ones and current experience includes past experience, yet also disjunct, as we note that a work's original intention, or even function, can be completely supplanted.

Considered as process, Benjamin's model of reception thus differs from that of Jauss. Whereas Jauss presents a closed circle, or perhaps a spiral, in which new production generally bears a clear filiation to the past, Benjamin's scheme is linear, partial, and open at both ends, embracing the conflicts and contradictions of reception. Exoticism in particular has much that can be illuminated by this sort of model. It is a topic which, as we've noted, stretches representational processes to their utmost, and in so doing can reveal the contingent work of representation itself, as a closer look at Benjamin's theory reveals.

Benjamin looked particularly for liminal features that would illuminate the dynamics of artistic reception. Whereas Adorno's greatest interest was in music and Jauss's was in literature, Benjamin's attention was directed specifically toward visual representation. The question has long tantalized how much the theoretical differences of aesthetic theorists can be attributed to the different forms of artistic production they favored. In Benjamin's case, at least, his theory does capture specific visual cues for analyzing artistic reception.

Benjamin pointed to one feature almost completely overlooked by others, namely that "[t]he consideration of techniques of reproduction, more than any other line of research, clarifies the decisive importance of reception."⁵² Indeed, his "Art-Work" essay is, among other things, an extended attempt to prove this very point. But these means of reproduction affect different media in different ways. Whereas a musical or

literary text is essentially "allographic," a vehicle to convey codes independent of their contingent forms and thus far more amenable to reproduction, traditional visual artifacts such as painting and sculpture are "autographic": unique, independent objects valued as much for having shared in the presence of the artist as for their objective or cognitive content.⁵³ But for the same reason, visual artifacts are most directly threatened by spatial or temporal displacement.

Benjamin's model of reception, attuned to discontinuities, is thus especially appropriate to visual artifacts, which by nature are most easily fractured and supplanted in circulation. Further, the essential paradox of exoticism, making the distant proximate, parallels particularly this condition endemic to the visual arts. Both artworks and exoticist knowledge are threatened with the highest degree of fundamental, qualitative change in the process of circulation. As we shall see, tracking the visual circulation of ancient Assyrian artifacts from such media as jewelry, illustrated magazines, and panoramas through theatrical and artistic representation confronts us with extraordinary disjunctions and contradictions.

Further, Benjamin's concern with reproduction was related to his interest in audience as a modality of reception.

Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into a progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie.⁵⁴

Whether or not we are inclined to agree with this congruence of content assumed between the film and the painting, it is clear that Benjamin's concern with reception of objects cannot be separated with his concern for the variety and composition of audiences.⁵⁵

A final feature of Benjamin's thought to consider here is one that goes far beyond Jauss: his concern for power relations. Benjamin's cultural criticism is rarely far from this fundamental theme, as in his famous aphorism, "There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism."⁵⁶ The comment was meant generally to indict Western practices that enable the elevation of unique individuals and privileged interpretations through a systematic submersion and deferral of others. But it is surely nowhere more appropriate than in the enterprise of exoticism, paralleled and interpenetrated by the legacies of imperialism and colonialism. In our case, the acquisition of Mesopotamian artifacts, essentially taken with impunity by Western powers from the Ottoman empire, is precisely the sort of deed that John MacKenzie, a historian of imperialism, calls "that ultimate imperial act."⁵⁷

The final point, then, toward establishing Benjamin's contribution to exoticist reception is the suffusion of power relations within each term of the system: audience, artifact, production, and threshold. Benjamin's analytical stress on discontinuity,

inversion, and similar features might be deemed a setting of traps to make visible the working of power. Further, we can see now an additional aspect of Benjamin's emphasis on reception. To stress the formative role of reception offers material to empower the mute audience and to offer an alternative to traditional progressivist accounts based on artistic production. Reception, the resubjectivizing of a whole seemingly integral and fixed, is a tool to manifest, and perhaps even to challenge, the "barbarism" of a form of inherited cultural discourse, to brush it against the grain.

At the same time, there is a certain "presentist" danger of losing the full force of historical specificity by focusing on that which connects to a contemporary concerns. Benjamin was certainly aware of the difficulty, while also perhaps acknowledging its inevitability.⁵⁸ Such a concern shapes this study as well. While I have distinct interpretive and methodological goals, I place considerable weight (and the majority of this text) on the historical particularities of the milieu of reception. My goal in historicizing theory is to open it up to the myriad permutations of historical experience as well as contemporary concerns. In this sense, continuing in the project enunciated by Benjamin can also involve extending it beyond his particular, sometimes idiosyncratic, emphases.⁵⁹

THE ABOVE INQUIRY, then, presents us models and tools of reception designed particularly to fit exoticism. First, through his conception of the artwork's perpetual mobility, as well as the "horizon of expectation" and its attendant devices, Jauss offers a central ideal for the articulation of historical interaction. To take it seriously as a model of cultural practice, however, necessitates that we do not confine ourselves to the realm of a predefined canonical "seriousness."

The Frankfurt theorists allow us to further adjust and historicize Jauss's conception. Adorno's emphasis on the incommensurability (and thus imbalance) between the object and human agency offers a parallel to the directed, imbalanced pattern of exoticist interchange and an important clue to the constrained position of the exotic object within the structure of reception. Benjamin's work underwrites a broader analysis of the institutional, stylistic, and hierarchical nature of dissemination: emphasizing that the object's reception cannot be considered apart from the conditions of its circulation.

Such an approach necessitates considering a wide variety of representational artifacts throughout visual and popular culture: from painting to magazine, from museum to theatre. But this amounts only to taking seriously the richness and complexity of the period's visual culture. As Jonathan Crary has noted, "The circulation and reception of *all* visual imagery is so closely interrelated by the middle of the [nineteenth] century that any single medium or form of visual representation no longer has a significant autonomous identity."⁶⁰ Crary's work especially has outlined

the polymorphousness and complexity of visual culture in the nineteenth century in a way that decenters and fractures the putative importance of hitherto privileged media. This study will look in depth at the range of visual media that predominated in the period before photography's omnipresence was established around the turn of the twentieth century. The distinctions and oppositions of media are as important as the distinctions and oppositions of audiences. We will have the opportunity to compare the impress of different "scopic regimes" at several points such as in different views of the British Museum at the end of Chapter four.

Having now articulated directly the structural concerns of reception most germane to this inquiry, the final two sections will be devoted to turning it to the subject at hand. Reception's overlap with postcolonial theory, the most extended theoretical treatment of the Western exotic, belongs first. A final section on theorizing history through reception will use the same critical apparatus for parallel concerns in historical exoticism.

POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: EXOTICISM AS RECEPTION

We have been guided from the start by aspects of the work of Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and others. Now I want to broaden this connection and at the same time turn to a goal somewhat anomalous to most (literary) postcolonial studies. It is anomalous in two ways. First, I am concerned with an interaction that takes place largely within the West itself. Second, it is one whose force was largely (though not purely) historical. Historical reference also has had a place in contemporary postcolonial writing. This is evident as early as Césaire's writings of the 1950s, but to concentrate upon them necessitates first a return to the foundation of the postcolonial critique. It is not a simple return, however, but rather one informed by a knowledge of later developments.

Said's *Orientalism* remains an essential touchstone here, specifically for its truly historical engagement in a way that is still rare. While so much of it has been amended, debated, and problematized (not the least by Said himself in later works), the book's full challenge for thinking through historical exoticism has rarely been seriously considered. I do not want here to repeat the now-conventional criticisms of Said's early work, but rather to focus on a less-examined aspect of *Orientalism* particularly significant for the present study.

Bhabha succinctly describes Said's stance in *Orientalism* as a "conflictual economy . . . [a] tension between the synchronic panoptical vision of domination—the demand for identity, stasis—and the counterpressure of the diachrony of history—change, difference . . ."⁶¹ While most commentators on the book have focused on the synchronic, Bhabha rightly sets Said's conception between these two distinct modes of exoticist process. Only by taking both seriously does the full complexity

of the work emerge. Indeed, it is especially through Said's (albeit intermittent) awareness of the force of history that he prefigures more recent concerns.

Said's most common figure for the exotic is a "constraint" that is a "system of moral and epistemological rigor" in which the Orientalist's task is to confirm the expectations of the audience.⁶² This arrangement corresponds to the "panoptical vision of domination" described by Bhabha and is indeed almost exclusively employed in a synchronic manner. It is figured in Said's dominant metaphor of Orientalism as a theater for performance to Western audiences. The constraint model is particularly applicable for Said when Orientalism is seen as a system of exclusion in which Orientalism effectively supplants the Orient itself. This social/political critique of exoticist representation, then, occurs around what is locked out of it. "Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them")."⁶³

This "constraint mode" (as I will call it) matches Benjamin's Janus-like image of culture and barbarism. What appears to widen the acquaintance of the West actually amounts to impoverishing and holding apart the East. In the constraint mode exoticism is a zero-sum game. Said's conception here points to the stark imbalances of power in exoticism and reflects the most explicitly political aspect of the notion of exoticist resistance. It is also posited, as the above quote makes explicit, on a stark binary contrast between East and West.

This polarity focuses much of Said's discussion in *Orientalism* and has borne considerable criticism. The monolithic view of the West it appears to promote can seem as unjustifiable as the nebulous East of Orientalist legend.⁶⁴ But it is Bhabha's crucial realization that such binarism is not simply a given in Said's conception. In fact, when Said shifts to a diachronic frame, he conceives of his subject as a "dynamic interchange" in which relations and expectations are more multivalent and categories are no longer completely fixed.⁶⁵ Considering "how the Orient, and in particular the Near Orient, became known in the West . . . since antiquity," Said finds that "What gives the immense numbers of encounters some unity" is not a situation of constraint so much as what he calls one of "vacillation."

Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either as completely novel or as completely well known; a new median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things . . . The threat is muted, familiar values impose themselves, and in the end the mind reduces the pressure upon it by accommodating things to itself as either "original" or "repetitious." . . . The Orient at large, therefore, vacillates between the West's contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in—or fear of—novelty.⁶⁶

Said's description above thus shifts from the exclusionary mode of "constraint" to the more polyvalent one of "vacillation" precisely as it shifts from synchronic to diachronic perspective. In the process, a complex structure of reception is articulated. Novelty and familiarity are opposing endpoints on a scale of distance between work and audience, as an artifact moves from the edge of the audience's horizon toward its center.

Formally, this diachronic "vacillation" mode of Said corresponds closely to a structural description of Jaussian reception. It tracks reception in historical time and even notes the formative influence of reception on further production. But it also, much unlike Jauss, identifies a judgmental, explicitly political functioning within the structure itself. In terms closer to Adorno, the horizon's shift is not a resonant meeting of similar interests so much as a mechanism for controlling difference.

As a whole, Said's conception stands between Jauss and the figures of the Frankfurt school, surveying both synchronic and diachronic ranges. It also is directly applicable to the example of Montagu with which we began. As Said describes it, the familiar receives contempt while exoticist novelty elicits a compelling delight and fear. This description corresponds almost precisely with Montagu's perception of the audience for travel writing, which is similarly bored with the familiar and shocked or amazed by the unusual. Said's description again articulates the nature of exoticist resistance: the way audiences apprehend information about the East. But Said's description also explains, in way Montagu's text cannot, the equal centrality of representational transformation within the circulation of exoticism. For if Montagu's presentation of her description depends on the claims of mimeticism, on her own eye-witness account, Said allows us a view of the circulation of information in exoticism as one of simultaneously receiving and controlling new information, which involves not only transmitting but also transforming it on ideological grounds. On this basis, perhaps the most important aspect of Said's "vacillation" mode is its' coining of "a new median category . . . that allows one to see new things . . . as versions of a previously known thing." This median represents precisely the transformation of vision that works both to accept and control new information.

In fact, this entire passage in *Orientalism* plays an important role in Bhabha's key essay, "The Other Question." His concern is not merely to focus on this "median category," but in effect to liberate it from its position between the other two, which conceptualizes the exotic in a way that localizes exoticist knowledge as it obviates binarism. As Bhabha himself put it, "I have attempted to provide a form of the writing of cultural difference in the midst of modernity that is inimical to binary boundaries."⁶⁷ He addresses not only the binarism of East versus West, but also another essential pairing within our conception: that of the synchronic versus diachronic. Thus Bhabha explicitly locates his concept of the colonial subject

as “mimic” as an “ironic compromise” between these two.⁶⁸ Mimicry works for Bhabha, then, to oppose both forms of organization as exclusive, totalizing concepts, both the “panoptical vision of domination – the demand for identity, stasis” of synchrony and “the counterpressure of the diachrony of history – change, difference” that obtains in diachrony.

From such a position emerges what is perhaps the central emphasis of this portion of Bhabha’s work: the hybridity (and heterogeneity) generated in the mimic’s realm of cross-cultural interaction. As he puts it, “If the effect of the colonial power is seen to be the *production* of hybridization . . . [it] enables a form of subversion founded on the undecidability that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention.”⁶⁹ Developed as the very basis for contesting established categories, hybridity directly and explicitly becomes a grounds for resistance by the colonized against the colonizer’s authority.

In all, Bhabha does to Said’s conception something parallel to what Benjamin’s conception does to Jauss’s theory: opens it to complexities and contradictions generated in the fissures between established categories. Bhabha’s emphasis on the varied, shifting inflections of a hybrid subject, its oppositional “undecidability,” complements Benjamin’s acknowledgment of the possibility of an interpretive paradox or disjuncture among contemporaneous audiences as a work is reproduced. Both stand *between* constituencies, those associated with different media or social classes for Benjamin, as those of colonizer and colonized for Bhabha.

The hybridity of an exoticist artifact, in the terms introduced by Bhabha, could be taken as its ability to respond to different codes (cultural, visual, etc.) without answering fully or precisely to any one. Hybridity, in this sense, is not the “resolution” of different categories into a new totality, but a provisional, changing presence that flourishes *around* established categories. As Ella Shohat and Robert Stam have recently put it, “Hybridity is dynamic, mobile, less an achieved synthesis or prescribed formula than an unstable constellation of discourses.”⁷⁰

This formulation of hybridity and its connection to the complexities and incommensurabilities of a milieu of reception are central to the present study.⁷¹ But I want to turn this conception to a slightly different kind of between-ness from that of, say, nineteenth-century colonial India or other more common subjects of postcolonial writing. I will be concerned most directly with the same kinds of interactions examined by Bhabha, Said, and many others in a colonialist context, but now within the West itself. In this, I follow the suggestion of Annie Coombes that hybridity can be conceived not only between East and West, but within the West as well.⁷² Indeed, this becomes the obvious conclusion if one jettisons the monolithic binarism of East-West, as now the West’s categories of self-definition (of class, gender, race, nation, etc.) are similarly acknowledged as fields of difference to be negotiated. This sort

of approach also aligns in fundamental ways with the recent emphasis of Nicholas Thomas on the localized specificity of colonial and cross-cultural “projects.”⁷³

Bhabha’s critique of Said, therefore, is also the basis of a productive re-reading of Said. Indeed, Said himself has recently acknowledged Bhabha’s concept of hybridity as “*the* essential idea for the revolutionary realities today.”⁷⁴ In subsequent chapters, I refer more often to Said’s own original concept of “vacillation,” but it must be understood within the light of later developments as described here, overlapping the core concept of hybridity. Further, bringing these terms together, vacillation and hybridity, reformulates hybridity within a field of historical reference. Unlike the more common spatially defined hybridities such as those generated by the interaction of colonizer and colonized, it presents the condition of hybridity as one that might also be generated and measured temporally. It suggests historical difference can also be a field for the inscription of hybridity, as will be elaborated in the following section.

Assessing the vacillation of the exoticist artifact in its Western circulation is assessing its traversal of what I have called thresholds not only around, but also specifically within the West itself. It is also to assess the artifact’s capability for resistance to Western audiences. While this resistance may exist on a somewhat different order from that of the colonizer-colonized relation, it still works in fundamentally the same fashion within the West itself. Indeed, just as Bhabha pronounces the colonial subject “dependent for its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition *within* the authoritative discourse itself,” one might locate hybridity, too, as an entity within the very discursive milieu of the West.⁷⁵

The examples with which we have begun – the works of Delacroix, Tissot, and Ingres (via Montagu) – each display a degree of what could be called vacillation. Each stands between witnessed actualities and the need to obey a perceived audience’s aesthetic (Delacroix), religious (Tissot), and gendered (Ingres) expectations. Each represents a negotiation of conflicting expectations. Each work could be deemed hybrid in terms of the authenticity of the resultant object, neither fully real nor fully unreal. But if there is even a degree of hybridity in these examples of a widespread “domestic” exoticism, much more radical and contentious were the representational practices activated by the far greater resistance posed by ancient Assyrian artifacts as they migrated among expectations in a divided Western horizon.

THROUGH ART HISTORY, reception theory, and postcolonial theory, the past three sections have articulated a logic for analyzing the exotic and have rooted it at various points in cultural analysis. From Nochlin, Jauss, and Said, a consistent configuration emerges of what one might call a productive binarism. Said and Nochlin stress that Orientalism is a way in which the West manages, by producing, the East. Formally, this parallels exactly Jauss’s making production a final product of reception. Through

Richon, Benjamin, and Bhabha, in turn, these binarisms (of East and West or production and reception) are fragmented as they are contextualized, highlighting the fluid and idiosyncratic construction of audience, the formative work of media of dissemination, and the hybridity/vacillation of the exoticist artifact itself.

For all of these approaches, exoticism involves not merely the acceptance of a phenomenal given, but also the concretization of supposition. For in each case, the construct of the exotic is never unmediated, but rather always forged in connection with the concerns of the observer. Though ever resistant in some degree to the Western observer's acquaintance, the exotic object is inevitably construed from the observer's language. Thus reception is not merely a useful methodology in the study of exoticism. Rather exoticism, in a fundamental sense, *is* reception.

Most of the theorists considered above will be called upon individually at subsequent points in this book. The methodology I have here forged around and through them stands behind the historical thrust of my argument. Still, as already suggested by Benjamin and Said, the exigencies of historical, diachronic reference demand treatment in their own right. This is especially true here as our ultimate goal is only partly the analysis of artifacts created in the nineteenth century, but also the direct confrontation with unexpected objects from millennia earlier: the arts of ancient Mesopotamia. Benjamin's figure of the past as a growing "pile of debris," could be no more appropriate anywhere than to a study of archaeological reception.⁷⁶ Hence the final section of this chapter will confront directly the question of historical reference and its place in the exotic.

"THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY": THEORIZING
HISTORICAL EXOTICISM

Though the situation is slowly changing, difference measured temporally has not been considered extensively in postcolonial writing.⁷⁷ The vast majority of studies of modern exoticism, both visual and literary, deal with the West's relation to the coeval East. Bhabha is quite right that Said's treatment of vacillation, his most fundamental historical perspective is "underdeveloped," but it is symptomatic of a larger tendency.⁷⁸

The mimeticist assumption, too, obviously privileges spatial over temporal exoticism. Whereas a traveler may convince us that he or she has actually been to another part of the globe, an analogous claim to having visited another century is far less likely to be convincing. But particularly from the standpoint of reception, the two claims, for spatial versus temporal difference, are related. Defining exoticism as we have done, including diachronic distance, and thus reinforcing its ties with historical subjects inaccessible to direct experience, does not discard established interpretive criteria so much as resituate them. The seeming antipodes of past and present

represent yet another binarism whose terms may also be questioned and resituated in the theoretical terms here at work.

Both Jauss and Benjamin write in direct opposition to the putative neutrality of Rankean historicism, which claims to treat each historical period evenly but only at the expense of severing all affective ties—of association, interest, etc.—between subject and audience. "Distance in time," as Jauss puts it, "is to be put to use, and not—as historicism would have it—overcome."⁷⁹ Jauss breaks down the positivist dichotomy of true/false or subjective/objective in evaluating historical knowledge by stressing the formative role given to the "probable" in historiography from as early as Aristotle.⁸⁰ The critique of historicist continuity associated with Marxist historiography, central to Benjamin's position, is also part of a broader tradition. Indeed, from Aristotle's treatment of history as an inferior (because less universal) form of poetry to Hegel's insistence that catharsis is the purpose of historical writing, a lengthy tradition emphasizes the formative role of reception stylistics in historiographic production.⁸¹ Every historical account is not only part of a particular *Weltanschauung* but also, as for Aristotle and Hegel, must obey certain contemporary rules of composition, presentation, and purpose that are defined with reference to the implied audience. On these grounds, a historical account, much like a contemporary travel account, stakes its claim to actuality on its ability to successfully evoke a reality in the viewer's or reader's judgement.⁸²

Just as he treats literary artworks, Jauss thus posits a historical fact not as a disjunct, objective entity, but as an evolving process: an event located within diachronic and synchronic frames, which "first becomes relevant in the experience of the retrospective observer."⁸³ Hence, the seemingly obvious distinction between past and present is dissolved into a more homogeneous arrangement, distinguishing rather between diachronic and synchronic reference measured from the observer. To adapt this more directly into the methodology of artistic exoticism, it amounts to underlining that the nineteenth-century French viewer, for example, is essentially as distant from a work that purports to describe a nineteenth-century Islamic practice (spatially distant) as one devoted to an event of ancient Gaul (temporally distant). Both probe the boundaries of the observer's horizon of expectation, a cultural consensus located in a particular time as well as place. Both are assessed by the viewer by similar means, through appeal to the prevailing knowledge, belief, ideology, etc., active within the horizon. Both, finally, are removed from any "original" context in the process of transmission across thresholds.

This relation between space and time as modes of distancing in exoticism has been most concisely adduced by Johannes Fabian. The contemporary Western metropolis is a site of presentness from which "given societies of all times and places may be plotted in terms of relative distance from the present."⁸⁴ This relative distance is measured on a matrix constructed of two axes of space and time. Hence, for

Fabian, space and time are two interdependent (though not precisely homogeneous) dimensions of a common currency of difference.

The more we see that temporal distance functions in many of the same ways as the spatial variety, the more we find correspondences between historical representation and the exoticist process we have already described. In the work of the historian Reinhart Koselleck, a member of the same Gadamer/Heidegger circle as Jauss, we find a meditation on the specific implications of a reception-based approach for historical knowledge.

Like Jauss, Koselleck stresses that the particular horizon of expectation of modernity necessarily resists closure. It is not merely a yearning for novelty that is here in evidence, but the result of a basic structural feature of *Neuzeit* and one triggered by the ontological conditions attendant to colonialism: a necessary disparity between experience and expectation.

Even the new experience gained from the annexation of lands overseas and from the development of science and technology was still insufficient for the derivation of future expectations. From that time [the eighteenth century] on, the space of experience was no longer limited by the horizon of expectations . . . It became a rule that all previous experience might not count against the possible otherness of the future.⁸⁵

Koselleck quotes Wilhelm Büsch to describe the representational negotiations involved in *neuzeitlich* experience: "at first things appear otherwise, but the next time it is as one expects."⁸⁶ This wrenching structure of perception underlies precisely the "vacillation" between strangeness and familiarity noted by Said and the "hard circumstances" for the validation of the exotic *récit* protested by Montagu. This fundamental structure of nineteenth-century European perception, which correlates with the colonialist experience mentioned specifically by Koselleck, can be seen to have both enriched and problematized Western expectation, presenting much to both confirm and complicate traditional Western knowledge.

Koselleck is most interested in the epistemological confusion within the horizon triggered over time by factors such as colonialism. This has clear affinity with the "undecidability" that Bhabha makes central to hybridity. But, as with Jauss, Koselleck, too, may be supplemented for our purposes with Benjamin, although now through another aspect of his writings, particularly his remarkable "On the Philosophy of History."⁸⁷ For Benjamin, just as for Jauss, Ranke exemplifies the historicist position. Benjamin stresses two primary factors that counter the claim to objectivity made by the "universal history" of historicism (XVII). The first is the very malleability of history. "Every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably." (V) The present plumbs the past for its likeness and all that does not fit is in danger of being lost completely. This conception reformulates the quasi-assimilative function of the

Jaussian horizon. The transformation that goes on within it is thus shown to be also a system of exclusion, working to deny aspects of the past that do not fit present purposes. Benjamin's conception, that is, calls attention to the fact that thresholds work as much to keep out certain elements as to let in what can be productively transformed.

The second factor stressed by Benjamin to counter historicism calls up the explicitly political motives behind this exclusion. The construction of historical continuity, through which a contemporary identity is historically augmented with a selectively chosen "tradition," is designed to enforce the interests of the ruling classes. As Benjamin states, "The continuum of history is that of the oppressors." Thus Benjamin describes the necessary oppositional work of the historical materialist, brushing history "against the grain," (VII) as forging a "discontinuum," which is the historical analogue to an act of revolution. "The awareness that they are about to make a continuum of history explode is characteristic of the revolutionary classes at the moment of their action." (XV) In another context, Benjamin calls the historical conception of the ruling class a distorting mirror whose constructed image of an ideal order must be smashed.⁸⁸

This, then, is precisely the ideological force of the distinction noted above between Jauss's continuously spiraling historical model and Benjamin's bounded and fragmented one. Jauss's model is based on a fundamental continuity, however complex or attenuated. Benjamin, by contrast, offers "places where tradition breaks off . . . points that could offer a handhold to those who would like to get beyond it."⁸⁹ His synchronic focus, whose work is "to blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history," (XVII) is itself a radical, oppositional act.

Moreover, this move ultimately fuses the two forms of distance that concern us: those of past and present. It is not then purely a question either of defending or attacking a unified tradition, but rather of analyzing the conditions of a particular moment in which such a tradition is asserted. Synchrony and diachrony are neither absolute approaches, but rather related and interdependent, as in Benjamin's striking image of "the woof of the past fed into the warp of the present."⁹⁰ Views of the past are also inevitably views of the present. Each forms and echoes the other.

But, as is also intimated by Benjamin, avoiding binary choices means confronting instead the conflicts between the two terms. These conflicts, indeed, are paramount for Benjamin's project of getting beyond historical continuity. The particular moments of Assyrian archaeological discovery illuminate, vividly and precisely, the conflicts involved in historical construction based on artifactual evidence, diachronic sweeps founded in a complex synchronic moment. Archaeological discovery was sponsored as part of the process on which depended a positivistic ideal of the advancement of knowledge. Yet its fruits, as we shall see throughout the second portion of this book, could also work to threaten the enforcement of tradition including that

of Western progress and contemporary superiority over the ancient culture being excavated.

HAVING BEGUN THIS chapter with some examples in artistic exoticism, we conclude with a final one, which now brings us more specifically to the context involved in the reception of Assyrian artifacts. It is the very earliest such moment we will consider. In mid-nineteenth-century England, as we shall see in detail, Assyrian artifacts were fastened upon as objects of both historical interest and aesthetic admiration by popular (lower-class and middle-class) audiences, despite the explicit condemnation of many voices of cultural and social authority. This split in aesthetic taste not only highlights a synchronic social division, but also affects directly what was seen as a diachronic, almost transhistorical fact: the universal value of ancient Greco-Roman art.

Martin Bernal has characterized as "hellenomania" a nineteenth-century tendency to unique privileging of the ancient Greeks, certainly at work in England of the time.⁹¹ This adulation was focused on Greek sculpture throughout and took perhaps its definitive form in the testimony to Parliament in 1816 of virtually the entire Royal Academy over the acquisition of the Elgin marbles.⁹² The vaunted "great truth" and "ideal beauty" of the marbles were meant not only as a historical example, but a model to emulate for contemporary artists.⁹³ In this sense, it is the basis for promulgating, indeed enforcing, a Jaussian horizon with specific visual ramifications. Moreover, just as ancient Greek art was to found contemporary English production, so all other arts of antiquity were perceived almost purely in terms of their bequest to the Greeks as part of a unified Hegelian "chain of art" derived most specifically from Wincklemann.⁹⁴ Classical Greece was thus the focus of a teleology both retrospective and prospective: a hierarchy through which the heterogeneity of ancient production was focused and transformed into a scheme of progress.

Many of Assyria's greatest detractors, as we shall see, were also upholders of the canonical value of Greek production. The discovery of ancient Assyrian art, in many ways, was the first real challenge to the primacy of the Greeks. In the space of just a few years, it bequeathed a huge cache of strange and undeniably impressive monuments, previously quite unknown. Housed (rather grudgingly) in the British Museum, in the same wing as the Elgin marbles and other classical Grecian works, Assyria distinctly threatened reigning verities.

Tracking the reception of Assyrian (and other ancient Mesopotamian) artifacts in the nineteenth century, the essential project of this book, is assessing through the circulation and mediation of the Assyrian artifacts an exoticist operation of the very same kind as those with which we have begun this chapter. Assyria presented a unique resistance to the classical ideal, a style through which the West had defined itself for centuries. This intimation of an antique "other," in turn, was the fount of

a series of transformations and hybrid Assyrian representations, as we shall see in the later parts of this book.

Turning, as we will do in the following chapters, to the subject matter of exoticism and the Assyrian discoveries in the nineteenth century thus presents material that directly confronted a dominant, Grecian-based ideal founded in the work of Wincklemann. As we move toward what was seen as the visual antithesis of the classical ideal, this current chapter has presented a complementary move, presenting a framework designed to confront the positivist, progressivist conception of art history pioneered, in fact, by Wincklemann himself.

Indeed, Jauss developed his methodology of reception specifically to counter Wincklemann. Deeming Wincklemann's *History of Ancient Art* "the first landmark of the new historiography of art . . . made possible through the historicizing of antiquity," Jauss goes on to consider the effect of this historicism, which he deems devastating for art history. "Under historicism . . . art history handed over lock, stock and barrel its legitimacy as a medium for aesthetic, philosophical, or hermeneutic reflection."⁹⁵ The Greek ideal stands not just for a class of artifacts, but an interpretive style that seems to put them, unmediated, in the foreground. Not only historicism per se is concretized through the Greeks, but also an ideal of progress: precisely the seamless, hierarchical order criticized in detail by both Jauss and Benjamin.⁹⁶

We enter into the matter of nineteenth-century exoticism, then, not only as a distinct subject in the visual culture of the time, but also as a locus for a particular kind of constitution of visual evidence. It is one based not on production, progress, and unitary meaning, but rather forged through an analysis of reception – not pretending to a comprehensive account but rather engaging the complex fragmentations of form and meaning that accrue in circulation. Turning from purely theoretical concerns, we enter into the following chapter to look more closely at the specific nineteenth-century milieu of exoticist representation.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION: A NEW ANTIQUITY

1. Freud, 1960: 173–4. Sigmund Freud to Martha Bernays, 19 October 1885. I have slightly amended the translation to match the original more closely.
2. On Freud and archaeology, see especially Kuspit, 1989; Schorske, 1998.
3. Hardy, 1986: 132.
4. Riegl, 1982. On this conception, see Bann, 1990: especially 110.
5. Peter Gay suggests that Freud identified with and envied Schliemann more than anyone else of his time. Gay, 1988: 172.
6. Freud owned Layard's book as well as its sequel. Gamwell and Wells, 1989: 198.
7. Bhabha, 1994: 85–92.
8. Benjamin, 1999: 14.

CHAPTER ONE. EXOTICISM AS SYSTEM

1. Said, 1979: 67.
2. Notebook 9, fol. 30. Quoted in Toussaint, 1971: 14.
3. Montagu, 1906: 156–7.
4. Tissot, 1898–9: iv.
5. Johnson, 1982.
6. As is conventional, I use "Orientalist" to refer to a particular subgroup of nineteenth-century artistic exoticism, referring largely to images of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa.
7. Enrico Crispolti, "Exoticism" in *The Encyclopedia of World Art*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1963: V, cols. 297–311. [Quote on col. 297.]
8. Cf. "Exoticism" in *McGraw Hill Dictionary of Art*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969: II, 370–1; "Exotismus" in *Lexikon der Kunst*, Leipzig: E. A. Seeman, 1989: II, 403–4.
9. Certeau, 1986: 69. Cf. Leduc-Adine, 1988: 461.
10. On exoticism and advertising, see Kornatzki, 1987.
11. On orientalizing tobacco, see Thompson, 1988: 31–2.
12. On the exception of Henriette Brown, and her subsequent marginalization, see Lewis, 1996.
13. See Bhabha, 1992.
14. More recently analyzed by Clifford, 1990.
15. "L'exotisme ne serait-il pas d'abord un phénomène de réception?" Leduc-Adine, 1988: 461; Mason, 1998: 1–2, cf. 147.

16. Çelik and Kinney note that "feminist and postcolonial critics should question bipolar logic." Çelik and Kinney, 1990: 56. Lant's study of cinematic Egyptomania notes that a full account "demands a more careful and flexible explanation than that allowed for by a simple binary formulation of the East as Other, which would buttress the West's understanding of itself." Lant, 1992: 97. Prakash sees a primary motivation of postcolonial studies as "to go beyond *Orientalism* itself in exploring the implications of its demonstration that the East/West opposition is an externalization of an internal division in the modern West." Prakash, 1995: 199. Not long after Said's publication of *Orientalism*, he advocated "entirely refusing designations like 'Orient' and 'Occident.'" Said, 1985: 95.
17. Mason, 1998; Célestin, 1996; Figueira, 1994. Cf. the related discussion of Guest, 1992: 102–4.
18. The fullest array of exotic production is displayed in Pollig, 1987. See also Gallini, 1996.
19. A model exploration of the wide reach of exoticism in the visual arts is Pochat, 1970. On the term's conventional reference, see Maigne, 1985.
20. Césaire, 1972: especially 31, 33. On Fanon's similar approach, see Gallini, 1996: 216.
21. Kesteloot, 1962: 197–8.
22. Rosenthal, 1982: 8. For some recent examples of continuing opposition to Said and related work, see Atil, 1995: 91; Ackerman, 1998; MacKenzie, 1995.
23. Bhabha, 1984. The core of mimeticism is a belief in "the progressive discovery of the essentially unmediated nature of reality." [94].
24. See William Johnston, introduction to Thornton, 1983: 10–11.
25. See especially the exhibitions of Thompson, 1988; Benjamin, 1997. On alternative exhibition styles of exoticism, see Bohrer, 1991.
26. Nochlin, 1989. For Said's endorsement of Nochlin's essay, see Said, 1985: 104.
27. Thevoz, 1980: 76.
28. *Ibid.*, 79.
29. Richon, 1985: 34.
30. *Ibid.*, 35.
31. Tickner, 1988: 105.
32. Janzen, 1980: 2. Cf. Kemp, 1983: especially 31–2. On reception study and visual representation, see also *idem.*, "Kunstwissenschaft und Rezeptionsästhetik," in Kemp, 1992: 7–27; Kemp, 1994; Kemp, 1998. On the range of methods of reception, see Suleiman and Crosman, 1980: 3–45; Holly, 1996: 195–208; Vaisse, 1996; Gamboni, 1996.
33. Clifford, 1988: 261.
34. Lamartine, 1978: 344.
35. "the horizon . . . constitutes all structures of meaning related to human action and primary modes of comprehending the world." Jauss, 1989: 197. The most detailed account of the horizon and its working is in "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory." Jauss, 1982b: 3–45.
36. Jauss, 1989: 198.
37. Jauss, 1982b: 21.
38. Thus, Peter and Christa Bürger see Jauss's project as "a reformulation of the formalist theory of literary evolution." Bürger and Bürger, 1992: 69. Yet, Russell Berman's introduction to the same book (p. xii) finds that Jauss's work formulates "anxieties" in normative interpretation.
39. Jauss, 1982b: 32. Cf. George Kubler's similar model of the artwork as sequence, Kubler, 1962.
40. Jauss, 1982b: 19.
41. On these limitations of Jauss, see Wolff, 1993: 112–5. Cf. Moxey, 1994: 38–9.
42. See especially Bourdieu, 1995.
43. Bryson and Bal, 1991: 184–8.

44. On the context of reception in the Frankfurt school, see Wiggershaus, 1994: 218–222; Jay, 1973: 136–40.
45. Adorno, 1981: 184.
46. For Adorno on reception, see especially Adorno, 1997: 228–9; Jay, 1973: 54; Bürger, 1979: 124–44. See also Eisenmann, 1999. For Jauss's position on Adorno's theory, see Jauss, 1980; Jauss, 1982a: 13–21.
47. Among the vast literature on Benjamin, I have found the following particularly helpful: Bahti, 1992: 183–225; Buck-Morss, 1989; Hansen, 1987; Kemp, 1978; McCole, 1985; Shiff, 1992; Snyder, 1989; Tiedmann, 1988.
48. Benjamin, 1969: 187. On aura and reception in Benjamin, see Harootunian, 1996; Todd, 1989; Kauffmann, 1988: 513.
49. Benjamin, 1969: 71. Cf. Benjamin, 1999: 460 [N 2, 3]. Note: In all references to this work, the page number is followed by that of the particular entry quoted.
50. Benjamin, 1982: 226.
51. *Ibid.*, 227.
52. *Ibid.*, 235.
53. On this distinction, see Goodman, 1976: 113–23.
54. Benjamin, 1969: 234.
55. Adorno, for one, deemed the congruence "out-and-out romanticization." See his letter to Benjamin in Adorno, 1977: 123.
56. Benjamin, 1982: 233. The passage is also in "Theses on the Philosophy of History" Benjamin, 1969: 256.
57. MacKenzie, 1995: 53.
58. Cf. Benjamin, 1999: 470 [N 7, 7].
59. As we shall see in the third chapter, Benjamin's treatment of nineteenth-century reproductive media little acknowledges magazine engraving as a mode of visual reproduction.
60. Crary, 1990: 23. Similarly, for K. Dian Kriz probing the nineteenth-century Orient "involves engaging seriously with a much wider array of textual and visual materials than traditional art historical studies usually allow." Kriz, 1995: 130; see also Porterfield, 1998: 140.
61. Bhabha, 1994: 86. For a sketch of the critical fortunes of Said's book, see Prakash, 1995. Among Said's most important critics, see Porter, 1983; Ahmad, 1992: 159–219; Young, 1990: 119–140; Parry, 1987; Clifford, 1988: 255–276.
62. Said, 1979: 67.
63. *Ibid.*, 43.
64. "Monolithic" is the term of Behdad, 1994: 12.
65. Said, 1979: 14.
66. *Ibid.*, 58–9.
67. Bhabha, 1994: 251. "The Other Question" was first published in 1983.
68. *Ibid.*, 86.
69. *Ibid.*, 112. Hybridity is usefully defined and contextualized in Wolfe, 1997: 415–6.
70. Shohat and Stam, 1994: 42.
71. Hybridity itself as a term has recently come under a new attack, particularly by Robert Young, who has pointed to the racist legacy of the term. But this debate is peripheral to my own concerns, which are far less with the reification of a particular term than the complex phenomenon it denotes. See Young, 1995. In response to Young, see Hall, 1996: especially 259. Among the host of other words that might be employed, "syncretism" often emerges as the next best choice, although it has its own complexities. See Fisher, 1996; Becquer and Gatti, 1991; Stewart and Shaw, 1994.
72. Coombes, 1994: especially 110–11. See also Codell and Macleod, 1998.
73. Thomas, 1994.

74. Said, 1993: 317. Said treats it in connection with his own related conception of "counterpoint."
75. Bhabha, 1994: 86. Cf. Mason, 1998: 161.
76. In "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Benjamin, 1969: 258.
77. See the critique of McClintock, 1992. For some recent studies of temporal distance, see the discussion of Paul Carter below as well as the studies in Chambers and Curti, 1996: 65–120. Cf. also the considerable historical treatment of Thomas, 1994: especially 66–104. The title of this section is reborrowed from the still-provocative work of Lowenthal, 1985.
78. Bhabha's own deepest foray in this direction is "DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation," Bhabha, 1994: 139–70.
79. Jauss, 1989: 205.
80. *Ibid.*, 25–9. On types and implications of historical constructs, see White, 1973 and Arendt, 1963: 41–90.
81. Arendt, 1963: 45. Cf. Bann, 1995: 7–8.
82. Hayden White has been particularly concerned with this question. See especially, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," White, 1987: 1–25. Jauss's position has obvious affiliations with White, whom he refers to in Jauss, 1989: 39.
83. *Ibid.*, 41.
84. Fabian, 1983: 26. Cf. xiii on Fabian's congruence with Said's work.
85. Koselleck, 1985: 280.
86. *Ibid.*, 274.
87. Benjamin, 1969: 253–64. Roman Numerals in the text refer to the numbered sections of the original work.
88. Benjamin, 1985: 34. Tiedemann, 1989: 197. Cf. Wohlfarth, 1996.
89. Quoted in Tiedemann, 1989: 197.
90. Benjamin, 1982: 235. Michael Steinberg well describes this Benjaminian relation of past and present as "a pattern of returns, repetitions, and responses within the political dialectic of totality and fragmentation." Steinberg, 1996: 9.
91. Bernal, 1987: 281–336; Turner, 1981; Jenkins, 1980.
92. On the reception of the Elgin marbles, see especially Rothenberg, 1977; Pavan, 1974–5; Turner, 1981: 37–76.
93. See, for example, the excerpts from the testimony in Smith, 1917: 241 ff.
94. Jenkins, 1992: 65–70; Potts, 1994: 34.
95. Jauss, 1982b: 48, 51.
96. Arnold Hauser states "to treat the history of [ancient] art, as for example Wincklemann aimed to do, as that of an unbroken, steady progress is to indulge in a plain fiction." Hauser, 1985: 158.

CHAPTER TWO. THE SUBJECTS OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXOTICISM:
JOURNEYS IN SPACE AND TIME

1. "Exposition Universelle de 1855" in Baudelaire, 1962: 211.
2. Goncourt and Goncourt, 1989: 1, 1033.
3. On paradox as figure for exoticist authenticity, see Bohrer, 1996.
4. "Salon de 1846," in Baudelaire, 1962: 148.
5. On the Osages in nineteenth-century France, see Wiesinger, 1992: 81–2; Mason, 1998: 120–1.
6. Kriz deems Carthage in the nineteenth century, "accessible only through visible representations of its ancient and legendary past." Kriz 1995: 123. On Flaubert's historical preparation for Salammbô, see Paris, 1980: 64–6.
7. Fabian, 1983: 32.
8. Terdiman, 1985.

9. "Salon de 1864" Thoré, 1870: 89.
10. Thomas Cook's first European grand tour took place in 1856. By about the same time, Karl Baedeker had published guides in German, French, and English to nearly all of Europe.
11. Ackerman, 1986.
12. Ettinghausen, 1972: 21.
13. Brown, 1987: 67 [No. 65].
14. As Brown notes this disjuncture about Ingres and Turkey, Frederic Masson points it out in connection with Gérôme and Egypt, noting that the artist's voyages "have enabled him to reproduce, in so inimitable a manner, the scenes and characters of that Orient which is being every day more and more encroached upon by European customs and manners," Frederic Masson in Hering, 1892: 28. On allochroism in nineteenth-century travel writing, see Behdad, 1994: 46; Pratt, 1992: 64.
15. For example, *Phryne Before the Aeropagus* (Hamburg, 1861).
16. Nochlin, 1989: 38; "The Reality Effect" in Barthes, 1986: 141–8.
17. Peltre, 1998: 147.
18. For a detailed account of the Ancient Near East, see Kuhrt, 1995. Among the extensive bibliography of the region's more recent history, see Hourani, 1991. Part of the discussion in this section derives from a portion of Bohrer, 1998.
19. Gadd, 1936: 2–9; André-Salvini, 1994a; Dalley, 1994.
20. On antiquity and exoticism, see Hartog, 1988; Martin, 1990; Nippel, 1996.
21. Grant, 1843: 27; Mignán, 1829, *passim*. Cf. Fletcher, 1850, quoted in Chapter 6. Significantly, the topos is repeated in Eugène Flandin's account of Botta's archaeology, Flandin, 1845: 1083.
22. For a history of European representation of Mesopotamia, see Künzl, 1973; on the "Tower of Babel," see Minkowski, 1991; Wegener, 1995.
23. Paley calls Martin "a self-made man never officially honored by his own government." Paley, 1986: 136.
24. On the painting, see Paley, 1986: 131–138, 189–90.
25. Anon., 1825: 5.
26. *Ibid.*, 6.
27. Paley, 1986. For *Belsazzar's Feast*, see especially 128–38. On Martin, see also Balston, 1947; Feaver, 1975; London, 1975. The original oil painting of *The Fall of Nineveh*, of 1828, was formerly in the Royal Collection, Cairo, Egypt (Balston, 1947: 276; Feaver, 1975: 223–4). The work is known now from the many mezzotints Martin produced of it in 1830, such as Fig. 6.
28. Anon., 1828: 14. Monckton, 1948.
29. Anon., 1828: 8, 10–11.
30. *Ibid.*, 11, 14, 15.
31. Martin's work itself was well known in France throughout the later 1820s and early 1830s receiving critical, popular, and even royal acclaim. Gage calls Martin "the rage of England and the Continent in the 1820s." Gage, 1980: xv; Seznec, 1964.
32. The basic sources for this work are Spector, 1974; Johnson, 1981–9: I, 114–21. See also Berrebi, 1986: 37–49; Pomarède, 1998; Wright, 1997: 6–8.
33. Tourneux, 1886: 49. For the work's critical reception, see Porterfield, 1998: 117–19.
34. The similarities and differences between Delacroix's treatment of the subject and Byron's are summarized by Johnson, 1981–9: as N. 32. On the Byronic affinities of the work, see especially Spector, 1974: 59–73; Hureauux and Guégan, 1994: 38; Kabbani, 1986: 75. Byron was named as inspiration also in Delacroix's time. Tourneux, 1886: 48.
35. On exoticist mobility, see Bohrer, 1996 and Behdad's "principle of discontinuity" later in this chapter.